CIVIL RIGHTS-ABORTION PROTEsTs-42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) DoEs
NOT PROVIDE A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PROTESTERS WHO OBSTRUCT AcCESS TO ABORTION CLINICS-Bray

v. Al-

exandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
On March 10, 1993, Dr. David Gunn was shot to death outside
a Florida abortion clinic.' In Wichita, Kansas on August 19, 1993, a
I Larry Rohter, Doctor Is Slain During Protest Over Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1993, at Al [hereinafter Rohter, Doctor Slain]. Dr. Gunn was one of only a few physicians who performed abortions in the Pensacola area. Id. at BlO. Until Dr. Gunn
opened the Pensacola Women's Medical Services clinic in early 1993, there was only
one other clinic that offered abortions in the city. Id. at Al, B10. The doctor also
traveled to Georgia and Alabama to provide the service. Id. at B10. The police arrested Michael F. Griffin, age 31, immediately after the shooting. Id. at Al. Griffin
was later charged with murder. Id. The police said that Griffin was apparently not
active in any anti-abortion group. Id. at B1O. Griffin was, however, acquainted with
the protest's organizer, John Burt. Id. at Al, B10.
Most anti-abortion groups stated they did not approve of the use of violence
against abortion clinics. Id. at BlO. However, Don Treshman, the national director of
Rescue America, said: "'While Gunn's death is unfortunate, it's also true that quite a
number of babies' lives will be saved.'" Id. A member of the American Family Association asserted that "'the man that was killed-and it was unfortunate-he should be
glad he was not killed the same way that he has killed other people, which is limb by
limb.'" Felicity Barringer, Abortion Clinics Preparingfor More Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1993, at Al, A17. Additionally, some anti-abortion organizations claimed that
harassing doctors who perform abortions is one of the most effective means of protest. Rohter, Doctor Slain, supra, at B10. Randall Terry, the founder of Operation
Rescue, said: "'We've found the weak link is the doctor.... We're going to expose
them. We're going to humiliate them.'" Id.
A nurse at The Ladies Center in Pensacola predicted that Dr. Gunn's death
would have little effect on the abortion debate. Larry Rohter, Death of Doctor Refuels a
Debate-EachSide on Abortion Says Shooting at Florida Clinic Will Not Halt Struggle, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993, at A6 [hereinafter Rohter, Death of Doctor]. She said: "'We're
not going to let those people take away women's rights, and they aren't going to back
off.'" Id. The leader of the Florida chapter of the National Organization for Women
stated that security would be increased at clinics across the state. Id. The regional
director of Rescue America, John Burt, declared that protests would resume outside
The Ladies Center as soon as a replacement for Dr. Gunn was found. Id. Anti-abortion protesters have been demonstrating regularly outside the Pensacola clinic since
the early 1980s. Id.
Griffin was convicted of first-degree murder on March 5, 1994. Larry Rohter,
Man Guilty of Murder in Death of Abortion Doctor,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at Al5 [hereinafter Rohter, Man Guilty]. The jury deliberated for less than three hours. Id. The
jury disagreed with the defense's argument that Griffin had a nervous breakdown
after being exposed to anti-abortion literature and videotapes and thereafter accepted
blame for the murder to shield anti-abortion leaders. Id. Judge John Parnham immediately sentenced Griffin to life in prison, Florida's mandatory sentence for first-degree murder in cases in which the prosecution does not seek the death penalty. Id.
Griffin will not be eligible for parole for 25 years. Id. David Gunn, Jr., Dr. Gunn's
son, approved of the verdict but also expressed his belief that Griffin was not the lone
murderer. Id.
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homemaker active in the pro-life movement fired multiple rounds
from a handgun at Dr. George Tiller, wounding him in both arms.2
In the same month, Reverend David Trosch, a Roman Catholic
priest, attempted to run a newspaper advertisement that espoused
killing physicians who perform abortions.' A Bakersfield, Califor2 Seth Faison, Abortion Doctor Wounded Outside Kansas Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1993, at A12. Tiller was shot outside Women's Health Care Services, one of only a few
clinics in the country that performs third trimester abortions. Id. As a result, the
clinic was targeted extensively by abortion protests in the summer of 1991. Id. In
response to the shooting, Andrew Burnett, co-founder of Operation Rescue, stated
that: "'The chickens have come home to roost at Tiller's house.... It would seem
that he has been put out of commission, at least temporarily. I hope he will take this
opportunity to reevaluate what he is doing.'" Id. Reverend Keith Tucci, executive
director of Operation Rescue, on the other hand, distanced his organization from the
shooting, asserting: "'Operation Rescue does not support vigilante acts of violence.... We remain committed to a peaceful, nonviolent intervention at clinics to
save lives.'" Id.
The assailant, although chased by Dr. Tiller's coworkers, escaped by car. Id.
Rachelle Renae Shannon, age 37, was arrested at an Oklahoma airport shortly after
the shooting. Suspect in Doctor's Shooting PraisedKilling, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 22, 1993, at
A29 [hereinafter Suspect in Shooting]. Shannon was charged with attempted murder.
Id. Dr. Tiller returned to work at the clinic the morning after the shooting. Id. The
doctor explained: " ' I'm a health-care provider.... We had patients to take care of.'"
Id.
After the murder of Dr. Gunn, a friend of Shannon's quoted her as saying: "'Is it
really so bad?'" DirkJohnson, Abortions, Bibles and Bullets, And the Making of a Militant,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at Al. " ' People cheered when Hitler was killed,'" Shannon
was quoted as saying, "[a] nd this abortionist was a mass murderer.'" Id. Shannon had
written letters of admiration and praise to Michael Griffin while he was in jail awaiting
trial for the murder of Dr. Gunn. Id. at A8; Suspect in Shooting, supra, at A29. She
wrote in one letter, "'I know you did the right thing. It was not murder. You shot a
murderer. It was more like anti-murder."' Johnson, supra,at Al. Shannon also contributed to Griffin's defense fund. Suspect in Shooting, supra, at A29.
Most major anti-abortion groups have condemned the violence. Johnson, supra,
at Al. The National Right to Life Committee, for example, denounced efforts to link
violence to the anti-abortion movement as a whole. Id. at A8. Some radical factions,
however, have shown support for protesters who use violence to convey their message.
'
Id. at Al. Andrew Burnett said that he supported Shannon, calling her act " courageous."' Id. at A1-A8. Burnett warned that more shooting could be anticipated because nothing else has proved effective. Id. at A8.
Shannon was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree on March 25,
1994. 1l-Year Term in Shooting Outside Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at A1O. Judge
Gregory Waller sentenced Shannon to almost 11 years in prison. Id. During the sentencing hearing, Shannon told the judge that she had done nothing wrong. Id.
When the judge contradicted her and declared "You did [do] wrong,'" Shannon responded, "'They said that about Jesus.'" Id. Additionally, Shannon acknowledged
that rehabilitation would not work in her case because she " ' hope [s] that I'll always be
obedient to God no matter what it costs.'" Id.
3 Priest Scolded on Abortion Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at A20. The advertisement depicted a man holding a gun to a doctor wielding a knife over a pregnant
woman. Id. The picture was accompanied by the words: " 'Justifiable homicide.'" Id.
Trosch told The Mobile Register that "[i]f 100 doctors need to die to save over one million babies a year, I see it as a fair trade." Id. Roman Catholic officials criticized
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nia abortion clinic that had been the target of repeated protests
was decimated by fire on September 20, 1993.1 The incidence of
violence against abortion providers has risen substantially within
the last three years.' In an effort to combat this violence and the
resulting diminution of women's ability to exercise their constitutionally protected right to abortion, 6 the federal courts have emTrosch and gave him the alternative of recanting or resigning from his public position
in the church. Id. Trosch later stated that he was pleased with the publicity he has
received because of the ad. Priest Likes Results From Doctor-KillingAds, NEWS TRIBUNE
(N.J.), Aug. 23, 1993, at B3. Trosch said: "'Instead of paying $1,200 [for an ad], I got
a half billion dollars of free publicity.'" Id. (alteration in original).
4 CaliforniaCity's Abortion Clinic Burns, and Police Suspect Arson, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1993, at A19. Although their investigation was not yet complete, fire officials said that
the speed with which the fire spread and its intensity indicated arson. Id. The fire
resulted in approximately $1.4 million in damages to the clinic and two contiguous
buildings. Id. Henry Pacheco, the assistant fire chief, noted that the clinic had been
targeted by anti-abortion protesters in the past and that customers in neighboring
businesses had complained about harassment. Id. Judith DeSarno, president of the
National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association, attributed anti-abortion violence to the movement's loss of momentum on the political front. Id. She
hypothesized: "'Extremists on the anti-abortion side really are in a panic.... They
are in fact losing and are trying to raise the stakes as high as they can.'" Id.
5 See Rohter, Doctor Slain, supra note 1, at B10. Specifically, the National Abortion
Federation observed that reported acts of vandalism increased more than twofold between 1991 and 1992. Id. Additionally, the federation pointed out, arson incidents
escalated from four in 1990 to twelve in 1992. Id. Between the years of 1977 and
1990, clinics that perform abortions reported 129 violent incidents to the National
Abortion Federation. Mary F. Leheny, Note, A Question of Class: Does 42 U.S.C. Section
1985(3) Protect Women Who Are BarredFrom Abortion Clinics, 60 FoRDHAm L. REv. 715,
715 (1992) (citation omitted). Among these 129 incidents, 52 clinics were set on fire,
34 were bombed, and 43 were the sites of attempted bombings or arson. Id. Additionally, 269 clinics were vandalized, 266 were invaded, 77 received death threats, 64
clinics' patients or staff were assaulted and battered, 22 clinics were burglarized, and
there were two kidnappings. Id.
This escalation of violence results from the proposition that "'if you think that
abortion is murder, then act like it's murder.'" David A. Gardey, Federal Power to the
Rescue: The Use of§ 1985(3) Against Anti-Abortion Protestors,67 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 707,
707 (1992) (quotation omitted). The anti-abortion campaign has led to more than
50,000 arrests of protesters. Id.
Abortion providers view the escalating violence as a "call to arms" and claim that
it is time to defend themselves. Barringer, supra note 1, at Al. In response to the
increase in violence, abortion rights activists are installing bullet-proof windows and
instituting 24-hour patrols of clinics. Id. Other physicians, however, say there is little
more they can do to defend themselves. Id. at A17. Dr. Warren Hem, the medical
director of a Boulder, Colorado, abortion clinic, stated: "'I am sitting here behind my
desk, looking out a bullet-proof window. I work in four layers of bullet-proof windows. Death threats are so common they are not remarkable. I went to a pro-choice
meeting in Denver recently, and as I walked through the picket line, someone said,
'[y]ou should die.'" Id.
6 The right to abortion was announced in Roe v. Wade and was reaffirmed in
PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvaniav. Casey. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163
(1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833
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(1992). For a detailed discussion of Casey, see Mary Edwards & Brian D. Lee, Note, 23
SETON HALL L. Riv. 255 (1992).

The plaintiffs in Roe were Jane Roe, an unmarried pregnant woman; James Hubert Hallford, a physician who had been arrested in the past for performing abortions; and John and Mary Doe, a married couple who wanted to avoid pregnancy
because Mrs. Doe was suffering from a "neural-chemical" disorder. Roe, 410 U.S. at
120-21. All three plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of Texas's criminal abortion
statutes. Id. at 121-22. The statutes rendered criminal all abortions except those performed to save the life of the mother. Id. at 117-18 (quotation omitted).
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, first determined that Jane Roe had
standing and that her abortion in 1970 did not render her case moot. Id. at 125. The
Court concluded, however, that Dr. Hallford was not entitled to relief because he did
not allege that any federally protected right was in substantial and immediate danger.
Id. at 126. The Justice also averred that the Does' claim was too speculative and their
injury too indirect to state a cause of action. Id. at 128-29.
The Court next engaged in a lengthy analysis of the history of abortion jurisprudence. See id. at 129-47. Justice Blackmun noted that criminal abortion statutes "are
of relatively recent vintage." Id. at 129. At common law, the Justice articulated, abortions performed before quickening (the first movement of the fetus) were not subject
to criminal penalties. Id. at 132 (footnotes omitted). The Court concluded that abortion is viewed more harshly under current American abortion statutes than it was at
common law, at the adoption of the Constitution, and throughout the greater part of
the 19th century. Id. at 140.
Justice Blackmun identified three justifications for criminal abortion statutes. Id.
at 147. First, the Justice enunciated, some have claimed that the laws were the result
of a Victorian interest in deterring promiscuity. Id. at 148. The second reason given
in support of criminal abortion laws, the Court recounted, is a concern for women's
health and safety in a medical procedure. Id. at 148-50. Finally, Justice Blackmun
contended, the third justification is the State's interest in safeguarding the life of the
fetus. Id. at 150.
Acknowledging that there is no explicit reference to the right of privacy in the
Constitution, Justice Blackmun explained, however, that the Court has identified a
right of privacy in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments and in
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 152 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that, wherever the right of privacy is founded, it is broad enough to cover a
woman's decision to end her pregnancy. Id. at 153. Justice Blackmun qualified this
right by holding that it must be balanced against the state interest in regulation. Id. at
154. TheJustice elaborated that when "fundamental rights" are at stake, regulation is
warranted only when the state can demonstrate a "compelling" interest and when the
legislation is narrowly tailored to that interest. Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
The Court did not determine the point at which life begins. See id. at 159. Justice
Blackmun observed, however, that the law has never bestowed the unborn with all the
rights enjoyed by persons. Id. at 162. As a result, the Justice refused to allow Texas to
embrace one theory of life, thereby transcending pregnant women's rights. Id.
Reasoning that mortality rates during the first trimester are lower than mortality
rates of normal childbirth, Justice Blackmun set the end of the first trimester of pregnancy as the point at which the State's interest in maternal health becomes "compelling." Id. at 163. After the first trimester, the Justice elaborated, the State may
regulate abortion as long as "the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health." Id. Conversely, Justice Blackmun explicated, during
the first trimester, physicians and patients are free to decide, without State interference, whether to terminate a pregnancy. Id. The Justice declared that the State's
"compelling" interest begins at viability. Id. At this point, the Court explained, the
fetus is capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. Therefore, Jus-

2100

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2096

ployed 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 7 to provide a federal remedy for clinics
and patients harmed by abortion protesters.8
Despite the federal courts' rather widespread utilization of
§ 1985(3) to enjoin abortion protests, in Bray v. Alexandria Women's
tice Blackmun clarified, the State may prohibit abortion after viability, except in those
instances when the mother's life or health is at stake. Id. at 163-64. Because Texas's
statute failed to differentiate between abortions performed before and after the first
trimester, the Court held that it could not withstand constitutional attack. Id. at 164.
7 Section 1985(3), which is the surviving version of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 and is entitled "Depriving persons of rights or privileges," provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to
all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving
his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or
Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to
injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or
advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in
his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753,
757-58 (1993).
The first clause of § 1985(3), also called the deprivation clause, enjoins conspiracies that deprive "either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The second clause of the statute, commonly called either the
prevention or the hindrance clause, applies to conspiracies "for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of
the laws." Id. This Note focuses on the prevention/hindrance clause of § 1985(3).
8 See, e.g., National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585
(4th Cir. 1990) (affirming an injunction under § 1985(3) forbidding Operation Rescue from obstructing access to Washington, D.C. metropolitan area clinics), rev'd in
part and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d
Cir. 1989) (holding that conspiracies aimed at women are within the ambit of
§ 1985(3)), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr.
v. Advocates for Life Inc., 859 F.2d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 1988) (validating an injunction
under § 1985(3) enjoining protesters from interfering with abortion services);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Mateo County v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765
F. Supp. 617, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (allowing a cause of action against anti-abortion
protesters under § 1985(3)).
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Health Clinic,9 the United States Supreme Court refused to interpret the statute as affording protection to women as a class.10 The
majority announced that § 1985(3) provides no federal cause of
action against protesters who obstruct access to abortion clinics."
Rather than provide a federal remedy, the Court suggested that
clinics bring state court actions for trespass or for intentional obstruction of access to private premises. 2
Operation Rescue1 3 and its individual members are extremely
dedicated to preventing abortion and reversing its current legality. 4 To attain these objectives, Operation Rescue arranges, coordinates, and takes part in "rescues"1 5 at abortion clinics around the
9 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). See generaUy Lissa S. Campbell, Comment, A CriticalAnalysis of Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic and the Use of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to
Protect a Woman's Right to an Abortion, 41 KAN. L. REv. 569, 588 (1993) (disagreeing
with the Bray Court's analysis because women are a class under § 1985(3) and the
protesters acted with a class-based animus); Karen Chopra, PuttingThe JudicialSqueeze
On The Civil Rights Act Of 1871, 1993 DET. C.L. REv. 1315, 1354-55 (concluding that
Bray narrowed the scope of § 1985(3) to such an extent that congressional legislation
in the only available means of remedying the injustices created by the decision); Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme
Court's Next Opportunity To Unsettle Civil Rights Law, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1357, 1403-04
(1992) (advocating that the Supreme Court should enjoin abortion protesters who
create "a factual situation.., similar to that of the South in 1871"); The Supreme Court,
1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. REv. 144, 341 (1993) (asserting that despite
the Bray Court's restrictive reading of § 1985(3) "challenges to remedy the discriminatory actions of private conspiracies remain viable under the statute").
10 Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 759-60. The Court held that neither "women seeking abortion" nor "women in general" qualify as a class under § 1985(3). Id. at 759.
11 Id. at 757-58, 758.
12 Id. at 768. On the state level, Justice Scalia noted, these offenses may be prosecuted criminally and may also give rise to civil damages. Id. The majority asserted
that the mere fact that the petitioners committed these offenses to stop abortions
does not transform them into federal causes of action. Id.
13 Operation Rescue has been defined as "an unincorporated association whose
members oppose abortion and its legalization." National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.
1990), rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993). Operation Rescue folded onJanuary 31, 1990. John E.
Foster, Note, Women as a Class Under Section 1985(3): A Realistic Approach, 8J.L. & POL.
781, 789 (1992). Founder Randall Terry cited financial difficulties relating to a National Organization for Women (NOW) lawsuit as the reason for the organization's
demise. Id. (citation omitted). "Operation Rescue National" has taken the place of
the original Operation Rescue. Id. (citation omitted).
14 Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1488. Because the Supreme Court failed to
include the factual background in its Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic opinion,
all the facts in this Note are taken from the district court's opinion.
15 The district court defined a "rescue" as a "demonstration at the site of a clinic
where abortions are performed." Id. at 1487. The demonstrators, called "rescuers,"
deliberately trespass on the clinic's property and obstruct access to the clinic thus
ceasing operations for the period of the rescue. Id. "Rescuers" perceive their demon-
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country, including clinics in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area. 6 The goal of the "rescue" is to interrupt operations at the
targeted clinic, thereby effectively closing the clinic during the
demonstration.17 Operation Rescue's tactics include trespassing
upon clinic property and physically obstructing access to clinics,
which prevent patients and staff from giving or receiving medical
services or psychological counselling. 8 Thus, "rescues" create a
significant risk that the targeted clinic's patients may sustain physical or mental injury. 19
strations as "rescues" of the fetuses that would have otherwise been aborted that day.
Id.
16 Id. at 1487-88. These "rescues" have been organized under such names as The
D.C. Project, Project Rescue, and The Veterans Campaign for Life. Id.
17 Id. at 1488. Randall Terry, Founder and National Director of Operation Rescue, explained the purpose of a rescue in an affidavit: "'[W] hile the child-killing facility is blockaded, no one is permitted to enter past the rescuers ... Doctors, nurses,
patients, staff, abortion-bound women, families of abortion-bound women-all are
prevented from entering the abortuary while the rescue is in progress.'" Id. Operation Rescue's literature construes rescues as "'physically blockading abortion mills with
[human] bodies, to intervene between abortionists and the innocent victims.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Operation Rescue has sabotaged locks so
that clinic personnel cannot gain entry to the facility. Leheny, supra note 5, at 716.
Protesters also walk very slowly when being cleared from the area by police and refuse
to reveal their names when being questioned by law enforcement officials. Id. By
engaging in these rescues, Operation Rescue intends to (1) stop abortions; (2) discourage women from having abortions; and (3) demonstrate to society the strength
and virtue of their anti-abortion position. OperationRescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1488.
OnJuly 15, 1991, Operation Rescue began a six week "rescue" in Wichita, Kansas,
known as the "Summer of Mercy." Georgia M. Sullivan, Note, Protection Of Constitutional Guarantees Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3): Operation Rescue's "Summer Of Mercy,"
49 WASH. & LEE L. Rxv. 237, 238 (1992). Wichita was targeted because it was the site
of one of the only clinics in the country that still performed third trimester abortions.
Elizabeth A. Roberge, Note, Operation Rescue's Anti-Abortion Rescue Blockades and 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (a/k/a the Ku Klux Klan Act), 26 IND. L. Rxv. 333, 334 (1993). During
the summer-long mission, 2700 arrests were made and $800,000 in city and county
funds were expended to control the demonstrations. Id.
18 OperationRescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1489.
19 Id. Uncontradicted testimony at trial disclosed that obstructing clinic entrances
and exits and thwarting patient access could engender stress, anxiety, and psychological harm to (1) women scheduled to undergo abortions that day; (2) women with
abortion procedures already underway; and (3) women in need of counselling about
the abortion decision. Id. For example, physicians prescribe and insert a device to
effect cervical dilation for some women who choose to have an abortion. Id. Prompt
removal of the device is required to prevent infection, bleeding, and other complications. Id. If a clinic is closed by a "rescue," patients must either delay completion of
the procedure or look elsewhere for medical attention. Id. Uncontradicted testimony at trial demonstrated that there are both economic and psychological obstacles
to attaining the services at an alternative location. Id. (footnote omitted).
The blockades pose a grave threat to a woman's physical health when abortions
are delayed from the first to the second trimester of pregnancy. Foster, supranote 13,
at 787. The rate of complications is three to four times greater in second trimester
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Operation Rescue planned a sequence of gatherings, rallies,
and "rescues" in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area for November 10-12 and 18-20, 1989.20 These proposed events spurred
area clinics and women's organizations to action.2 ' On November
8, 1989, plaintiffs, nine clinics and five organizations 2 2 made a motion for a temporary restraining order forbidding defendants, Operation Rescue and six individuals,23 from obstructing access to
abortion clinics.24
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted
the plaintiffs' temporary restraining order. 25 After a trial on the
abortions than it is in first trimester abortions. Id.; see also Leheny, supra note 5, at
715-16 ("Physical and mental assault characterizes a patient's visit to a blockaded
clinic.").
20 OperationRescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1490. Operation Rescue had targeted the Commonwealth Women's Clinic in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area almost weekly
for the five years preceding the institution of NOW v. Operation Rescue in 1989. Id. at
1489. On October 29, 1988, for example, a "rescue" closed the clinic for over six
hours despite the efforts of local police. Id. The Falls Church police were outnumbered by "rescuers." Id. at 1489 n.4. Two hundred and forty "rescuers" were arrested,
but even this number of arrests could not prevent the clinic from being closed from
7:00 am to 1:30 pm. Id. at 1489 & n.4. The ."rescuers" did not limit their protest to
trespassing and obstructing access to the clinic. Id. at 1489. They also vandalized
clinic signs and fences, parked a car with deflated tires in the middle of the clinic's
parking lot to obstruct access to the lot, and scattered nails on the parking lot and
surrounding public streets. Id. at 1489-90. In April, 1989, the Metropolitan Family
Planning Institute in the District of Columbia was closed for approximately four hours
by a similar "rescue." Id. at 1490.
21 Id.
22 The "clinic plaintiffs" perform abortions and offer related medical and psychological services in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Id. at 1487 (footnote
omitted). The "clinic plaintiffs" included the following: Capitol Women's Clinic,
Inc., Hillcrest Women's Surgi-Center, Metropolitan Family Planning Institute, Alexandria Women's Health Center, Commonwealth Women's Clinic, Gynecare Associates,
Metro Medical Center, Inc., NOVA Women's Medical Center, Planned Parenthood of
Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc. (Falls Church), Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc. (Fairfax), and Prince William Women's Clinic. Id.
The goal of the "organizational plaintiffs" is to establish and safeguard women's
right to abortion. Id. The organizational plaintiffs included: National Organization
for Women (NOW), 51st State NOW, Maryland NOW, Virginia NOW, and Planned
Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc. Id. The "organizational plaintiffs" initiated this cause of action on behalf of both themselves and their individual
members. Id. The organizations' membership includes women who may want to obtain an abortion or related services in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Id.
23 The six individual defendants, organizers for Operation Rescue in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, included Michael andJayne Bray and Randall Terry. Id.
at 1488.
24 Id. at 1486. The plaintiffs requested the temporary restraining order to enjoin
Operation Rescue from "physically impeding access to, and egress from, premises that
offer and provide legal abortion services and related medical and psychological counselling." Id.
25 Id. After issuing the temporary restraining order, the court expedited the trial
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merits, the court concluded that the defendants had breached
§ 1985(3) by colluding to divest women of their constitutional
right to interstate travel 26 because a significant portion of the women seeking abortion services in the Washington, D.C. metropoli27
tan area clinics travel interstate to obtain these services.
Moreover, the district court found that the defendants had trespassed upon the plaintiffs' property28 and had constituted a public
nuisance. 29 In fashioning a remedy for the plaintiffs, the court forbade the defendants from trespassing upon or obstructing access
to abortion clinics in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.3 °
Affirming the decision of the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accorded great weight to the lower
court's finding that the defendants' actions traversed the line from
persuasion to coercion, thereby depriving women of their constitutional right to travel."1 The appellate court noted that the district
on the merits and consolidated it with the hearing for a preliminary injunction. Id.
At trial, the plaintiffs called nine witnesses and provided documentary evidence. Id.
The defendants, on the other hand, chose to present no evidence. Id.
26 Id. at 1493. The court asserted that the right to unencumbered interstate travel
to obtain abortion services was contained within the right to travel. Id. (citations
omitted). The court did not agree with the argument that clinic closings impress only
upon intra-state travel. Id. The court posited that if such a conclusion were accepted,
frustration of the right to travel could take place only at state borders. Id. The district
court further found that because the right to interstate travel is protected against
private as well as official encroachment, the plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate state action as part of their § 1985(3) claim. Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971) (citations omitted); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women
v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
947 (1990)).
27 Id. at 1489. For example, roughly 20 to 30% of the patients treated at the Commonwealth Women's Clinic in Falls Church, Virginia traveled from out of state to
reach the clinic. Id. These patients resided in Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia. Id. Additionally, the
majority of the patients served at the Hillview Women's Center in Forestville, Maryland travel interstate to procure abortion services. Id.
28 Id. at 1495. In Virginia, it is unlawful
(i) to enter or remain on the property of another after having been
forbidden to do so, (ii) to instigate or encourage others to enter or
remain on the property of another knowing that such persons have
been forbidden to do so, and (iii) to enter the property of another for
the purpose of damaging such property or interfering with the rights of
the owner, user or occupant of such property.
Id. at 1494 (citation omitted).
29 Id. at 1495. The court defined a public nuisance as "an act or condition that
unlawfully operates to injure an indefinite number of persons." Id. (citations
omitted).
30 Id. at 1497. The court held that the plaintiffs' request for nationwide injunctive
relief was overbroad. Id. The district court did, however, direct the defendants to pay
the plaintiffs' attorney's fees. Id. at 1498 (citation omitted).
31 National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir.
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court's holding was consistent with the holdings of other circuitsthat animus based on gender falls within the purview of
§ 1985 (3) .32 The Fourth Circuit further held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction. 3 Affirming
the scope given the injunction by the lower court, the Fourth Circuit agreed that broadening the injunction's ambit would4 conceivably enjoin activities protected by the First Amendment.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 5 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the lower courts' reasoning
and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.3 6 To demonstrate a violation of § 1985(3), the Court declared that a plaintiff
must establish: (1) that the conspirators were motivated by "some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus;" 37 and (2) that the rights targeted by the conspiracy were
"protected against private, as well as official, encroachment. ' 38 Because the defendant clinics and organizations failed to make either
of the requisite showings, Justice Scalia concluded, the injunctive
relief granted by the courts below was inappropriate.3 9
Section 1985(3) was widely ignored for almost one hundred
years after its enactment. 40 In 1951, the United States Supreme
1990), rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
32 Id. (citation omitted). Specifically, the court referenced decisions of the First,
Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Id. (citations omitted).
33

Id. at 585-86.

Id. at 586. Specifically, the district court refused to enlarge the injunction to
encompass conduct that "tend [s] to 'intimidate, harass or disturb patients or potential
patients.'" Id. The Fourth Circuit deemed Operation Rescue's practice of attempting
to verbally persuade women not to undergo abortions "expressive activity," in which
the court should not interfere. Id.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to dismiss the
state law claims raised by the plaintiffs. Id. The court further noted that the district
court did not reach the issue whether § 1985(3) provided a remedy for violations of
the right to privacy, and therefore did not address the question either. Id.
35 111 S.Ct. 1070 (1991).
36 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 768 (1993). The
Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the state-law claims were sufficient to support the injunction. Id.
37 Id. at 758 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (footnote
omitted)).
38 Id. (quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610,
AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)).
39 Id.
40 SeeCollins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 656 (1951) (asserting that "[t]his statutory
provision has long been dormant"); see also Campbell, supra note 9, at 573 (stating
that § 1985(3) "lay virtually dormant until 1951 when the Supreme Court heard Collins v. Hardyman"); Mark Fockele, Comment, A Constructionof Section 1985(c) in Light of
Its OriginalPurpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 402, 405 (1979) (observing that the statute "lay
34
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Court rendered the statute largely impotent in Collins v. Hardyman.41 In Collins, members of a political club alleged that the defendants had assaulted and intimidated them because the
defendants disagreed with the club's views. 42 Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, rejected the plaintiffs' § 1985(3) 43 claim because
their complaint did not allege that state officials were part of the
conspiracy or that the conspirators even purported to be acting
under color of state law. 4 The Collins Court interpreted the statute so as to avoid perceived constitutional infirmities.4 5 The majority concluded that although the plaintiffs' rights were abridged,
such private discrimination was not actionable under the statute.4 6
nearly dormant for a hundred years after its enactment"); Devin S. Schindler, Note,
The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): A Limiting Strategy Gone
Awry., 83 MICH. L. Rv. 88, 89 (1985) (contending that the statute "languished in
relative obscurity until 1971").
41 341 U.S. 651 (1951). For a discussion of the Collins decision, see Fockele, supra
note 40, at 421-23; Scott-McLaughlin, supranote 9, at 1383-85. The Griffin Court later
noted that the "clause could almost never be applicable under the artificially restrictive construction of Collins." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96.
42 Collins, 341 U.S. at 653-55. The complaint further alleged that because the
plaintiffs' meeting was terminated, their rights to petition the government for redress
of grievances was fettered. Id. at 654-55.
43 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 47(3)) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988)).
44 Collins, 341 U.S. at 655. The Collins Court reiterated: "'[T]he action inhibited
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.'" Id. at 658 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (footnote omitted)).
45 Id. at 659. Among the constitutional problems envisioned by the Court were
"issues as to congressional power under and apart from the Fourteenth Amendment,
the reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from national as distinguished from state citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act in its application to those two classes of rights." Id.
46 Id. at 661. Justice Jackson declared that the plaintiffs' "rights under the laws and
to protection of the laws remain untouched and equal to the rights of every other Californian, and may be vindicated in the same way and with the same effect as those of
any other citizen who suffers violence at the hands of a mob." Id. at 661-62. The
Court stressed that it was deciding no constitutional issue but was only interpreting a
statutory provision. Id. at 662.
Justice Burton, joined by Justices Black and Douglas, dissented from the majority
opinion, asserting that the language of the statute rebutted the conclusion that state
action is a requisite element of the statutory claim. Id. at 663 (Burton,J., dissenting).
The dissent observed that when the Congress of this era intended to include a state
action requirement in analogous civil rights legislation, it said so explicitly. Id. at 664
(Burton, J., dissenting). Justice Burton maintained that Congress is empowered to
provide a federal cause of action for victims of private conspiracies. Id. Furthermore,
the dissent argued that the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence does not prevent
Congress from enacting statutes to protect rights independent of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
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In Griffin v. Breckenridge,4 7 the Court sounded the death knell
for Collins and revived § 1985(3) when it announced that the statute encompassed purely private conspiracies.4" In holding that the
defendants' conspiracy could be reached under § 1985(3), the
Court dismissed Collins by maintaining that the constitutional infirmities envisioned in that case did not pertain.4 9 Guided by the
traditional judicial tendency to interpret Reconstruction civil rights
statutes as broadly as their language allowed, ° the Griffin Court
51
removed the state action requirement imposed by Collins.
Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart examined the statute's
47 403 U.S. 88 (1971). For an analysis of the Griffin decision, see Fockele, supra
note 40, at 405-07; Roberge, supra note 17, at 338-39; Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9,
at 1385-89; Sullivan, supra note 17, at 243-44. In Griffin, two white men blocked the
passage of a car of black men traveling on a Mississippi highway. Griffin, 403 U.S. at
90. The defendants, mistakenly believing the driver of the car to be a civil rights
worker, assaulted the plaintiffs with deadly weapons and prevented their escape. Id. at
90-91. More specifically, the defendants forced the plaintiffs out of their car, clubbed
them, and threatened to kill them if they did not obey the defendants' commands.
Id. at 91. The plaintiffs brought a cause of action under § 1985(3), claiming that the
defendants had prevented them from exercising their rights as citizens of the United
States and of Mississippi. Id. at 91-92. Included among the rights the plaintiffs asserted were infringed upon by the defendants' conspiracy were "their rights to freedom of speech, movement, association and assembly; the right to petition their
government for redress of grievances; their right to be secure in their person; their
right not to be enslaved nor deprived of life, liberty or property other than by due
process of law, and their rights to travel the public highways without restraint in the

same terms as white citizens .

. . ."

Id. The district court relied on Collins and dis-

missed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Id. at 92. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Id. (citation
omitted).
48 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96; see Roberge, supra note 17, at 338 (maintaining that the
statute "was given new life with the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge"). Specifically, the Griffin Court criticized the Collins state action requirement as
"artificially restrictive" and virtually inapplicable to the conspiracies the statute was
enacted to address. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 96.
49 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 95-96. The Court observed that Collins was decided 20 years
earlier and decisional law had evolved since that date. Id. at 93, 95-96.
50 Id. at 97 (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966);Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) (quotation omitted)). Id. Justice Stewart also
noted that statutes similar to § 1985(3) have been interpreted incongruously with the
reading given the statute in Collins. Id.
51 Id. at 96, 101. The Court found confirmation for this meaning in the judicial
interpretation of commensurate statutes, the structure of § 1985(3) itself, and the
statute's legislative history. Id. at 96. The majority opined that "there is nothing inherent in the phrase [deprivation of equal protection of the laws] that requires the
action working the deprivation to come from the State." Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
The Court also noted Congress's failure to include a state action requirement explicitly: "Indeed, the failure to mention any such requisite can be viewed as an important
indication of congressional intent to speak in § 1985(3) of all deprivations of 'equal
protection of the laws' and 'equal privileges and immunities under the laws,' whatever
their source." Id.
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legislative history and found no evidence that liability was not intended to attach to purely private conspiracies.5 2 Rather than requiring state action as an element of a § 1985(3) claim, the Court
announced that henceforth plaintiffs would have to demonstrate
that defendants were motivated by an "invidiously discriminatory
animus" as part of the statutory cause of action.5 3 Justice Stewart
contended that this requirement would circumvent the constitutional problems of construing § 1985(3) as a general federal tort
law.

54

Furthermore, the majority asserted that enactment of the statute was unquestionably within Congress's authority. 55 The Griffin
Court pronounced that Congress was within its Thirteenth Amendment 56 powers when it created a cause of action for African-American citizens who had been deprived of their right to equal
protection by private conspirators motivated by a racially discriminatory animus.5 ' Additionally, the majority determined that the
plaintiffs' § 1985(3) claim could be supported by the right to inter52 Id. at 99-100. The Court asserted that discussion of an amendment to the statute focused on the animus or motivation that would be required. Id. at 100. The
Court relied upon the comments of Representative Willard, who declared that the
revision "'provid[ed] that the essence of the crime should consist in the intent to
deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; in other words, that the Constitution secured, and was only
intended to secure, equality of rights and immunities, and that we could only punish
by United States laws a denial of that equality.'" Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd
Cong., 1st Sess. App. 188 (1871) (statement of Rep. Willard)).
53 Id. at 102. The majority interpreted the statute's equal protection language as
requiring a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. (footnote omitted).
54 Id. The Court articulated:
The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting
§ 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full
effect to the congressional purpose-by requiring, as an element of the
cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation
stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment.
Id.
55 Id. at 96.
56 The Thirteenth Amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."

U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII, § 1.
57 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105. In enacting the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court explained, the people of the United States committed themselves to ensuring the freedom of the newly emancipated slaves. Id. The majority declared that to honor this
commitment, "'Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally
to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to
translate that determination into effective legislation."' Id. (quoting Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968)).
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state travel.5 8 Reading the statute without the state action requirement but with the discriminatory animus requirement, the Court
concluded that the complaint stated a cause of action under
§ 1985(3). 5 9
The Court had the opportunity to expand the scope given to
§ 1985(3) by the Griffin Court in United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott,60 but instead chose to
narrow the statute's purview.6" The plaintiffs in Carpentersincluded
two nonunion workers attacked by a large group of union members.6 2 Justice White, writing for the majority, declared that conspiracies driven by an economic or commercial animus were
outside the ambit of § 1985(3).63 The Carpenters Court considered
58 Id. at 105-06. The majority observed that the fight to interstate travel is safeguarded by the Constitution, is not dependent upon the Fourteenth Amendment,
and can be asserted against private as well as governmental encroachment. Id. (citations omitted). The Court thus explained that under these facts the plaintiffs could
prove that:
[T]hey had been engaging in interstate travel or intended to do so, that
their federal right to travel interstate was one of the rights meant to be
discriminatorily impaired by the conspiracy, that the conspirators intended to drive out-of-state civil rights workers from the State, or that
they meant to deter the petitioners from associating with such persons.
Id. at 106.
59 Id. at 103. In fact, Justice Stewart articulated that "the conduct here alleged lies
so close to the core of the coverage intended by Congress that it is hard to conceive of
wholly private conduct that would come within the statute if this does not." Id. Because the allegations in the complaint reached so close to the essence of the statute,
the Griffin Court was not compelled to find § 1985(3) constitutional in all possible
applications. Id. at 107.
60 463 U.S. 825 (1983). For a thorough analysis of the Carpenters decision, see
Foster, supra note 13, at 796-97; Jane Kelly, Recent Decision, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 1175,
1180 (1991); Leheny, supra note 5, at 731-32; Roberge, supra note 17, at 339-41; ScottMcLaughlin, supra note 9, at 1389-95.
61 See Elizabeth L. Crane, Comment, Abortion Clinics And Their Antagonists: Protection From Protestors Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 181, 189 (1993)
(enunciating that shortly after Griffin, "the Court delineated, and limited, the kinds of
abridgement of fights towards which the statute should be aimed"); see also Carpenters,
463 U.S. at 854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (perceiving "no basis for the Court's crabbed and uninformed reading of the words of § 1985(3)").
62 Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 828. On January 17, 1975, several truckloads of union
members drove to the construction site where the plaintiffs were working. Id. The
union members assaulted employees of A.A. Cross Construction Co., Inc., which
hired workers regardless of union affiliation. Id. at 827-28. The district court held
that the statute's prohibition of class-based discrimination applied to the class of nonunion workers. Id. at 829. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the lower court. Id. at 829-30 (citing Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 1004
(5th Cir. 1982)).
63 Id. at 838. The Court also declared that state action is a prerequisite for finding
liability for a conspiracy to abridge First Amendment rights under § 1985(3). Id. at
830.
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it a "close question" whether Congress intended § 1985(3) to apply
to any class-based discrimination other than that motivated by
race. 6 4 Allowing a remedy under § 1985(3) whenever one political
group tried to harm another, the majority predicted, would transform the federal courts into watchdogs over state and federal
elections.6 5
In the wake of Griffin and Carpenters, the federal courts were
left with little guidance in determining what constitutes a class for
purposes of § 1985(3).66 A majority of federal circuit courts of appeal have found that women constitute a protected class under the
64 Id. at 836. Justice White articulated that the primary purpose of the statute was
to negate the discrimination endured by African-Americans and their advocates. Id.
But see Foster, supra note 13, at 793 ("Examining the legislative debate in light of the
political, racial and economic hatred motivating the Klan, the general conclusion that
Congress did not intend to restrict the protection of § 1985(3) to blacks and white
Republicans is inescapable."). The CarpentersCourt concluded that the legislative history did not support the proposition that discrimination based on economic status
was meant to be covered by § 1985(3). Carpenters,463 U.S. at 837.
65 Carpenters,463 U.S. at 836. Justice White stressed that the courts should be wary
of assuming such a role. Id. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and O'Connor, dissented, asserting that in its enactment of § 1985(3) Congress contemplated a federal remedy for all classes that attempt to pursue their rights in a
threatening environment, not just the victims of Ku Klux Klan terrorism. Id. at 839,
851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that rather than creating an
exclusive list of the classes of persons to be protected under the statute, Congress
envisioned a "functional definition." Id. As support for the proposition that Congress
intended to offer protection to groups other than those defined by raceJustice Blackmun insinuated that Congress meant to protect another group endangered by Klan
violence-economic migrants. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Justice explained that Congress wanted this group protected because of its "tenuous position in
the South." Id.
The dissent reiterated that Congress envisioned a federal remedy for any class of
persons whose equal protection of the law was in jeopardy. Id. at 853 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun concluded that the plaintiffs in the case at hand were
entitled to a federal remedy under § 1985(3). Id. The dissent averred that the individuality or identity of the victims was inconsequential to the conspirators. Id. at 854
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Blackmun argued, the plaintiffs were assaulted because of their nonunion status. Id. Furthermore, the Justice opined that
the defendants intended to encumber the exercise of a particular class's legal rights
because of their inclusion within the class. Id.
For an analysis that concludes that Carpenterswas wrongly decided, see Foster,
supra note 13, at 797 (arguing thatJustice White's reading of § 1985(3) was "clearly at
odds" with the intent of the statute's drafters).
66 See Campbell, supra note 9, at 570 & n.7 (averring that the Supreme Court has
decided only a few § 1985(3) cases since the statute's enactment and that "[m]any
questions remain unanswered about the scope" of the statute). The Supreme Court
had merely held that invidious discrimination motivated by race falls within the purview of § 1985(3), but invidious discrimination based on an economic or commercial
class does not. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.88, 102 (1971); Carpenters,463 U.S. at
838.
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statute.67 For example, before Carpenters was decided, the Third
Circuit concluded that women are protected under § 1985(3) in
Novotny v.Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association.68 The
court, persuaded by the tenet that people should not be subjected
to discrimination based on traits over which they have no control,
determined that animus against women fit within Griffin's classbased animus requirement. 69
67 See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th
Cir. 1990) (upholding the district court's finding that animus based on gender is
sufficient under § 1985(3)), rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women
v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding that conspiracies aimed at
women are "inherently invidious" and redressable under the statute), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 947 (1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) (declaring that
§ 1985(3) affords protection to classes based on race, gender, religion, ethnicity, and
political affiliation) (citations omitted); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20, 22 (1st
Cir. 1984) (holding public officials subject to liability under § 1985(3) for discriminating against female employees); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505
(9th Cir. 1979) (announcing that women who purchase disability insurance are a protected class under § 1985(3)); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978)
(holding that a claim alleging a conspiracy based on race and gender was properly
stated under § 1985(3)) (citations omitted); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Says. & Loan
Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1242 (3d Cir. 1978) (concluding that women are a protected
class under the statute), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or.),
affd as modified, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that women are a protected
class under § 1985(3)); see also Roberge, supra note 17, at 341-42 (stating that in the
majority of cases in which plaintiffs sought to enjoin anti-abortion protesters under
§ 1985(3), the lower federal courts provided the requested relief).
68 584 F.2d 1235, 1242 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
After examining the legislative history of the statute, the Third Circuit articulated that
"the language of § 1985(3) should not be unnaturally cropped to exclude women
from its protection." Id.
The plaintiff, John Novotny, was the Secretary and a member of the board of
directors of Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association (GAF). Id. at 1237.
Novotny alleged that officers and board members of the bank deprived female employees of the opportunity to advance within the company. Id. (footnote omitted).
Novotny further alleged that he was fired after he supported a female employee who
claimed that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. Id. at 1238.
Thereafter, Novotny brought an action against his former employer under § 1985(3)
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. The district court, holding that the
employees of GAF were unable to conspire in violation of § 1985(3), dismissed both
of Novotny's claims. Id.
69 Id. at 1243-44. The Third Circuit expounded:
[The] fact that a person bears no responsibility for gender, combined
with the pervasive discrimination practiced against women, and the
emerging rejection of sexual stereotyping as incompatible with our ideals of equality convince us that whatever the outer boundaries of the
concept, an animus directed against women includes the elements of
'class-based invidiously discriminatory' motivation.
Id. at 1243 (footnotes omitted).
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States framed the issue as whether
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Similarly, in New York State National Organizationfor Women v.
Tery, 7 ° the Second Circuit held that the expansive text of
§ 1985(3) does not bar women from its coverage. 71 The court
noted that differential treatment based on immutable traits such as
sex has been deemed invidiously discriminatory since 1973.72 Bea person harmed by a conspiracy to violate Title VII is denied equal protection of the
law under § 1985(3). Great Am. Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,
372 (1979). The Court held that § 1985(3) may not be employed to remedy Title VII
violations. Id. at 378. The majority reasoned:
If a violation of Title VII could be asserted through § 1985(3), a complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific provisions of the law.... The short and precise time limitations of Title VII
would be grossly altered. Perhaps most importantly, the complainant
could completely bypass the administrative process, which plays such a
crucial role in the scheme established by Congress in Title VII.
Id. at 375-76 (footnote omitted).
The Court declared that § 1985(3) establishes no rights. Id. at 376. Rather, the
majority declared, the statute was "purely remedial." Id. The Court held, therefore,
that a Title VII violation was insufficient to support a claim under § 1985(3). Id. at
378. As a result, the Court vacated the judgment of the Third Circuit and remanded.
Id.
70 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
71 Id. at 1358. Although the court conceded that Congress's main concern in enacting the statute was the protection of African-Americans, the majority found the
statute's broad language and legislative history more persuasive than the initial catalyst for § 1985(3). Id. at 1358-59.
72 Id. at 1359 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973)). At
issue in Frontierowas the right of a female member of the military to receive benefits
for her spouse in the same manner as a male member. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678
(footnote omitted). Under the statutes, a serviceman could claim his spouse as a
"dependent" without proving that she was in fact dependent on him for maintenance.
Id. (citation omitted). By contrast, a servicewoman was required to prove that her
spouse was dependent upon her for more than half his support. Id. at 678-79 (citation omitted). Sharon Frontiero, a United States Air Force lieutenant, brought suit,
claiming that the statutes violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by
discriminating on the basis of gender. Id. at 680 (footnote omitted).
Justice Brennan, writing for the FrontieroCourt, asserted that sex discrimination
has had a long and unfortunate history in the United States. Id. at 684 (footnote
omitted). Historically, the Justice contended, "such discrimination was rationalized
by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on
a pedestal, but in a cage." Id. The Court remarked that women's status has improved
considerably in the past few decades. Id. at 685. Justice Brennan asserted, however,
that "it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex
characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena." Id. at 686 (footnote omitted). Additionally, the Court
posited, because sex is an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident
of birth," placing impediments on the members of one gender violates the tenet that
legal infirmities should relate to individual culpability. Id. (citation omitted). Justice
Brennan stated that gender is not often indicative of capability. Id. (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Court declared that "statutory distinctions between the sexes
often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior
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cause conspiracies that target women are inherently invidious and
contrary to the concept of equality for all citizens, the majority concluded that such conspiracies must be included within the statute's
ambit.7" The Second Circuit contended that both its own and
other circuits have found that § 1985(3) extends protection to
76
75
74
classes based on gender, political affiliations, and ethnicity,
none of which were specifically envisioned by Congress when enacting the statute.7 7 The majority remarked that a restrictive reading of § 1985(3), which affords protection only to classes based on
race, was unsound. 78 The court reasoned that Congress would not
provide a federal remedy against private conspiracies to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the law and then preclude women
from receiving such protection." Therefore, the court proclaimed
legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members." Id. at
686-87.
The Court concluded that sex-based classifications, like those based on race, national origin, or alienage, are intrinsically suspect and can only be upheld under strict
scrutiny. Id. at 688. Under this standard, Justice Brennan pronounced, the military
benefits statutes are unconstitutional. Id. The Justice observed that the government's
only justification for the distinction was "administrative convenience." Id. The Court
held that such a rationale was insufficient to withstand strict scrutiny. Id. at 690.
Therefore,Justice Brennan concluded, the statutes violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 691.
73 Terry, 886 F.2d at 1359. The court argued that "[b]y its very language § 1985 (3)
is necessarily tied to evolving notions of equality and citizenship." Id.
74 See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979)
(concluding that § 1985(3)'s protection extends to women consumers of disability
insurance); Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1242 (determining that women are protected by the
statute); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978) (concluding that an
allegation of conspiracy directed at race and sex supported a cause of action under
§ 1985(3)) (citation omitted).
75 See, e.g., Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1987) (reiterating that
§ 1985(3) affords protection to groups classified by political views); McLean v. International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that "political
beliefs or associations" are protected by § 1985(3)) (citations omitted); Hobson v.
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that political affiliation with civil
rights organizations was protected by § 1985(3)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985);
Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that political association with the Republican party was protected under § 1985(3)).
76 See, e.g., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that
§ 1985(3) affords protection to classes defined by gender, religious beliefs, ethnicity,
and political affiliation) (citations omitted).
77 Terry, 886 F.2d at 1359 (citations omitted). See supra notes 74-76 (listing the
cases cited by the Terry court).
78 Terry, 886 F.2d at 1359. The court articulated that "'[a] narrow interpretation of
the statute as protecting only blacks and other analogously oppressed minorities is
untenable in light of the history of the Act.'" Id. (quoting Keating, 706 F.2d at 387)
(alteration in original).
79 Id.
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that women are a class for purposes of § 1985(3).8o
After determining that the plaintiffs constituted a protected
class, the Teny court found that the defendants in Terry conspired
to deprive women from gaining access to medical facilities."1 The
court rejected the argument that because the defendants bore no
malice toward women as a class, the statute's class-based animus
requirement was not met. 2 Instead, the court asserted that because the defendants' conspiracy targeted women seeking abortions, their conduct unveiled an animus motivated by gender.8"
The majority remarked that in most instances of invidious discrimination, constitutional rights are abridged only when members of a
class act in some way that offends the conspirators.8 4
The District Court of Oregon, in Portland Feminist Women's
Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 5 also concluded that women
who elect to exercise their constitutional right to privacy by undergoing an abortion are protected under § 1985(3).86 The court determined that to be protected under the statute, a class must be
capable of definition apart from the characteristics of the conspirators. 7 The court looked to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Life In80 Id.
81 Id. The court referenced Operation Rescue literature that promoted the blockading of abortion clinics. Id. The majority deemed this type of behavior a conspiracy
to participate in illegal activity. Id.
82 Id. Rather, the majority construed animus as an individual's fundamental attitude or purpose. Id.
83 Id. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that their conspiracy focused on an activity or a "subgroup" of women. Id. This contention, the majority
averred, was insufficient to evade the ambit of § 1985(3). Id.
84 Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs in Griffin were assaulted because the defendants believed them to be civil rights workers. Id. at 1359-60 (citing Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 90, 91 (1971)). The Second Circuit accused the defendants of deception in using the argument that their conspiracy targeted only those
members of the class who pursue their rights. Id. at 1360. The court relegated the
argument that the defendants' actions would benefit women to the "'we are doing
this for your own good'" category, reasoning that such an argument typically serves
only to disguise true motive. Id.
85 712 F. Supp. 165 (D. Or.), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988).
86 Id. at 169. Plaintiffs, a women's health center and certain of its employees and
patients, alleged that defendants, Advocates for Life, Inc., Christians in Action, and 12
individuals, conspired to interrupt, torment, and damage the health center's business
and property, to inflict emotional distress on the individual plaintiffs, and to preclude
the individual plaintiffs from exercising their right to abortion. Id. at 166. The court
framed the issue as whether "'women who exercise their right to choose abortion'"
constitute a protected class under § 1985(3). Id. at 167.
87 Id. at 169. The court quoted Carpentersto illustrate this proposition:
"[T]he intended victims must be victims not because of any personal
malice the conspirators have toward them, but because of their membership in or affiliation with a particular class. Moreover, the class must
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surance Company of North America v. Reichardt,8 8 which held that
women buying disability insurance constitute a class under
§ 1985(3), as authority for the proposition that the courts need not
limit the statute's scope to classifications based on race. 89 The majority could find no analytical difference between women who
purchase disability insurance and women who exercise their right
to choose abortion.9" Therefore, the court concluded that plaintiffs constituted a protected class under § 1985(3).91
Not all circuits have agreed that women seeking abortions are
protected under § 1985(3).92 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has
consistently refused to employ the statute in the abortion protest
context.9 3 In Roe v. Abortion Abolition Society,9 4 patients, doctors who
provide abortions, a clinic, members of the clinic's staff, and an
organization furnishing escorts for clinic patients, brought a class
action suit against the Abortion Abolition Society, individual members of the society, and the cities of Dallas and Mesquite, Texas
under § 1985(3). 5 The court emphasized that the members of the
protected class must have some trait in common apart from being
victims of the conspiracy; this shared characteristic must differentiate the class from the population at large.9 6 The majority further
described a protected class as one defined by traits of the targets of
the conspiracy, not by the views of the conspirators.9 7 The plainexist independently of the defendants' actions; that is, it cannot be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action."
Id. (quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFLCIO, 463 U.S. 825, 850 (1983)) (citations omitted).
88 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979).
89 PortlandFeminist, 712 F. Supp. at 169 (quoting Reichardt, 591 F.2d at 505). The
district court observed that other circuits have also relied on Reichardtin holding that
women are included within the statute's scope of protection. Id. (citations omitted).
90 Id.
91 Id. On appeal, the only contested issue was the constitutionality of the injunction issued by the trial court. Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for
Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681, 682 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction
for three reasons: (i) it was not impermissibly vague; (ii) it was not a content-based
restraint on expression; and (iii) the government had a significant interest in enjoining the protesters' disruptive conduct. Id. at 685-86. Thus, the court upheld a
modified version of the injunction without mention of § 1985(3). See id. at 687.
92 See Gardey, supra note 5, at 719; Crane, supra note 61, at 204.
93 See Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931, 937 (5th Cir. 1987); Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 1989).
94 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1987).
95 Id. at 932. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim on the grounds that § 1985(3) does not include a class that is
defined as not sharing the defendants' religious views about abortion. Id. at 932-33.
96 Id. at 934 (citations omitted).
97 Id. at 935. The court commented that in the case at hand, the plaintiffs defined
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tiffs, a group of persons who did not join in the defendants' opposition to abortion, the court concluded, did not constitute a class
within the meaning of § 1985(3).9"
Similarly, in Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan,9 9
the Fifth Circuit refused to extend § 1985 (3) protection to women
of childbearing age who wished to obtain medical services from the
Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic (MWMC).100 Initially, the
court contended that because the protesters did not physically prevent patients from entering the clinic, no one was deprived of their
constitutional right to obtain an abortion. 10 1 Because the plaintiffs
failed to show that the defendants' actions were motivated by an
"invidiously discriminatory animus" against the group, the majority
determined that women of childbearing age going to the MWMC
for medical services were not a class. 102 The court averred that
Congress did not intend that class-based discrimination be judged
by impact, but by animus or motivation.1 0 3 Therefore, the majority
proclaimed that the MWMC had defined its class in too under-inclusive a manner to warrant the protection of § 1985(3).1o4
By the time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the applicability of § 1985(3) to abortion protests, the federal courts of
appeal had grappled with and, for the most part, come to terms
themselves as persons who disagreed with the defendants' opposition to abortion. Id.
This belief, the court submitted, was "no more a common trait or characteristic than
would be a belief in using seat belts or in an ever-expanding universe." Id.
98 Id. at 935, 937. The court elaborated that "[n]o common unity of either religious denomination or faith characterizes those who seek, provide, or advocate a woman's freedom to choose an abortion." Id. at 936.
99 866 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989).
100 Id. at 791, 795. The Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic (MWMC) brought an

action to obtain a preliminary injunction to prohibit abortion protesters from picketing the clinic. Id. at 790. The clinic sought to forbid the demonstrators from protesting within 500 feet of its premises and to censor the language used during the
protests. Id. The district court refused to grant the preliminary injunction. Id.
101 Id. at 791 (footnote omitted). Although the protesters may have created a psychologically intimidating atmosphere, the court noted that some women did indeed
obtain abortions at the clinic, proving that the choice to undergo an abortion was
available. Id. The majority maintained that because pregnant women were still able
to obtain abortions at the MWMC, their constitutional rights remained intact. Id. at
794. The court inferred that what the plaintiffs were really "complaining" about was
that patients were being forced to hear speech that they did not wish to hear. Id. The
court refused to protect such an "unusual" right, especially in a public forum. Id.
102 Id. at 794, 795. The record demonstrated, the court stated, that the protesters
targeted their pro-life views at all groups, not just women who sought medical treatment at the MWMC. Id. at 794. The majority maintained that the defendants wanted
to discourage anyone who supported or provided abortions. Id.
103 Id. (citation omitted).
104 Id. The court asserted that this under-inclusiveness was so severe that it mischaracterized the controversy. Id.
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with the statute's relevance in the abortion protest context.' 0 5 In
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,' the Court defined the
issue as whether § 1985(3) creates a federal cause of action against
protesters who blockade ingress to and egress from abortion clin-

ics.'1 7 The majority found that because the petitioners were un-

able to demonstrate the requisite showings of a § 1985(3) cause of
action, they could not avail themselves of a federal remedy.'
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, began the analysis by addressing Griffin, which held that § 1985(3) is applicable to solely
private conspiracies.'0 9 The Justice, however, was quick to point to
language in that decision warning against using § 1985(3) as "a
general federal tort law."1 10 The majority recounted the Griffin
Court's declaration that a § 1985(3) defendant must intend to "deprive [the plaintiff] of equal protection.""' The Court underscored
Griffin's requirement that "there must be some racial, or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
12
conspirators' action."'
Basing its reasoning on common sense and precedent, the majority quickly disposed of the respondents' assertion that opposition to abortion satisfies the class-based animus requirement of
§ 1985 (3)."1 First, Justice Scalia chastised the district court for declaring that "women seeking abortion" represent a class." 4 While
acknowledging that a precise meaning of class may be unattainable, the Justice asserted that the term means more than an aggregate of persons with a common wish to participate in an activity of
105 See supra notes 67-84, 92-104, and accompanying text (discussing the decisions
of the federal courts of appeal).
106 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
107 Id. at 757-58.
108 Id. at 758.
109 Id. at 758-59 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971)). See
supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text (discussing Griffin).
110 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758-59 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102). In this way, the
Court observed, the "'constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting
§ 1985(3) as a general federal tort law'" would be avoided. Id. (quoting Griffin, 403
U.S. at 102).
111 Id. at 759 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102).
112 Id. (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102). Justice Scalia noted that the Court had
not, until Bray, had an opportunity to attach meaning to the "perhaps" in the oftquoted dicta of the Griffin opinion. Id.
113 Id. Justice Scalia ridiculed the notion that a law enacted in 1871 would cover
opposition to abortion. Id.
114 Id. One commentator argues that women seeking abortion are not a protected
class under § 1985(3) because anti-abortion protesters target the activity rather than
the women who engage in the activity. Gardey, supra note 5, at 742.
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which the defendant disapproves.1 15 Otherwise, the Court predicted, § 1985(3) would become exactly what the Griffin Court
sought to avoid-a general federal tort law. 116 Therefore, the
Court concluded that "women seeking abortion" do not constitute
a class for purposes of § 1985(3).117
Next, Justice Scalia rejected the respondents' claim that opposition to abortion represents an animus against women as a
whole. 1 8 Justice Scalia instructed that the statute mandates a focus
on women "by reason of their sex."' 119 In rejecting the argument that
opposition to abortion represents discrimination against women in
general, the Court cited the district court's finding that the petitioners' demonstrations were not motivated by any intent, malevo1 20
lent or benign, toward women.
Moreover, Justice Scalia proffered that a class-based animus
could be established only if: (1) hostility toward abortion can be
assumed to indicate a gender-based purpose; or (2) intent is imma12 1
terial and a class-based animus can be ascertained by effect only.
The Court rejected both propositions. 12 2 First, the Justice contended that opposition to abortion is not irrational and cannot be
translated into antagonism toward women. 123 Justice Scalia alleged
that whatever one's views on abortion, there are prevalent and
honorable reasons for disagreeing with it other than malevolence
toward women. 1 24 Indeed, the Justice maintained, one need not
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
Id. The majority contended that a class cannot be construed as the aggregate of
persons harmed by tortious conduct. Id. (quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters
115

116

& Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 850 (1983) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)).
117 Id.
118 Id. Accordingly, Justice Scalia found it unnecessary to decide whether women in
general constitute a class under § 1985(3). Id.

119 Id. The Justice conceded that the animus requirement does not demand that
the discrimination be maliciously motivated. Id.
120 Id. at 759-60. Rather, Justice Scalia observed, the district court found that the
petitioners' goal was to separate doctors performing abortions from fetuses. Id. at
759. The Court referred to the district court's assertion that the petitioners' sole
mission was to prevent abortion and convince the government and the American people that the practice should be outlawed. Id. at 759-60 (quoting National Org. for
Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989)).
121 Id. at 760.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124

Id. Justice Scalia acknowledged that some activities are such an irrational target

of opposition that if the activity is targeted and is one in which only a particular class

engages, a purpose to antagonize that class may be presumed. Id. For example, to tax
a person because he is wearing a yarmulke, the Court explicated, is to tax him for
being Jewish. Id.
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hold any opinion at all about women as a class to oppose
25
abortion.'
Having rejected the argument that opposition to abortion can
be assumed to bespeak gender-based intent, Justice Scalia observed
that the respondents' case was left to rest entirely on the proposition that intent is non-germane.' 26 Such a theory, the Court explained, presupposes that because only women have abortions,
expressing hostility toward abortion is tantamount to expressing
hostility toward women.' 27 Justice Scalia found no case law to support this reasoning.1 28 In Geduldig v. Aiello,' 29 justice Scalia noted,
the Court proclaimed that even though only women have the ability to become pregnant, every legislative classification regarding
pregnancy is not necessarily a gender-based classification.' ° The
Court also cited Personnel Administratorof Massachusetts v. Feeney,"'
in which the Court refused to invalidate a Massachusetts law that
gave employment preference to veterans, even though the class was
more than ninety-eight percent male. 132 Justice Scalia added to the
125 Id. As evidence for this proposition, the Court observed that both sexes are
represented on the two sides of the abortion debate. Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. (footnote omitted).
128 Id.
129 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
130 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20). In Geduldig,
women who were eligible to receive benefits under California's Disability Fund
brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a provision that excluded disabilities resulting from pregnancy from coverage. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 486, 489. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, held that the exclusion of such disabilities did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 494. The Court asserted that California did
not differentiate among persons or groups eligible for insurance under the program.
Id. FurtherJustice Stewart articulated, the State's decision not to insure all risks was
permissible. Id. at 494-95.
The Justice identified three legitimate State interests served by excluding disabilities resulting from normal pregnancy. See id. at 496. First, the Court averred, California has an interest in keeping its disability insurance program self-supporting. Id.
Second, Justice Stewart claimed that the State has a legitimate interest in maintaining
adequate payments for the disabilities that the program covers. Id. Finally, the Justice
asserted that California has a legitimate interest in preventing the employee contribution rate from becoming inordinately onerous. Id. The Court determined that these
three interests warranted the State's decision to exclude disabilities caused by normal
pregnancy from its coverage. Id. For the aforementioned reasons, Justice Stewart
proclaimed that California's disability insurance program did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 497.
131 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
132 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760 (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 270, 281). In Feeney, Justice
Scalia recounted, the Court articulated: "'Discriminatory purpose ... implies more
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
"because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.'"
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class-based animus requirement of § 1985(3) Feeney's holding that
an action must be taken "because of' its negative effect on a particular group. 13' The Court then declared that the disapproval of
abortion, standing alone, is not gender discrimination. 3
Id. (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (citation and footnotes omitted)) (footnote
omitted).
The issue in Feeney was whether a State veterans' preference statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259.
Under the Massachusetts statute, all veterans qualifying for civil service jobs "must be
considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans." Id. In practice,
this preference overwhelmingly benefitted males. Id. The plaintiff, Helen Feeney, a
non-veteran, claimed that the statute deprived women of equal protection. Id. (footnote omitted).
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted that women who have served in
the military have always been able to take advantage of the preference. Id. at 268.
The Justice also observed that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the
States from classifying. Id. at 271 (citation omitted). The Court enunciated that if a
classification is rationally based, varying effects on different groups normally create no
constitutional violation. Id. at 271-72 (citations omitted). Justice Stewart, however,
compared classifications based on gender to those based on race and proclaimed that
gender based classifications "have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and
often subtle discrimination." Id. at 273 (citation omitted). The Court articulated that
such classifications "must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives" and are often unconstitutional. Id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976)) (other citations omitted).
The majority concluded that the veterans' preference statute could be interpreted as other than a gender-based classification. Id. at 275. The Court asserted that
too many men were disadvantaged by the statute "to permit the inference that the
statute is but a pretext for preferring men over women." Id. Further, Justice Stewart
expounded, the distinction made by the statute was nothing more than it claimed to
be-a distinction between veterans and non-veterans. Id. The Justice concluded that
"the law remains what it purports to be: a preference for veterans of either sex over
nonveterans of either sex, not for men over women." Id. at 280. The Court found
that Feeney failed to show that the veterans' preference statute evinced a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 281.
133 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760-61 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279) (footnote omitted).
134 Id. at 761. As support for this proposition, Justice Scalia recounted the Court's
earlier refusals to apply heightened scrutiny to government abortion-funding limitations. Id. (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297,-322-24 (1980)). Instead, the Justice underscored, in both cases the Court employed the lesser rationality standard. Id.
The issue in Maherwas whether a state that participated in the federal Medicaid
program and that provided funding for childbirth was required to fund non-therapeutic abortions. Maher, 432 U.S. at 465-66. A Connecticut Welfare Department regulation required Medicaid beneficiaries to obtain a certificate of medical necessity
from their attending physicians before the State would finance the abortion. Id. at
466. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, declared that the plaintiffs, two indigent
pregnant women who were unable to acquire certificates of medical necessity, were
not a suspect class. Id. at 467, 470 (footnote omitted).
The Court explained that Roe v. Wade did not announce an unlimited right to
abortion. Id. at 473. Rather, Justice Powell explicated, a woman has a right to be free
from "unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 473-74. The Justice declared that Roe did not restrict the
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Attempting to give content to the phrase "invidiously discriminatory animus," the Court referenced the exact terminology used
by the Griffin Court and the language surrounding the phrase.1 35
The majority averred that opposition to abortion does not deserve
to be associated with racism.' 36 Justice Scalia submitted that the
governmental programs that prefer
Court has, in fact, upheld
137
childbirth over abortion.
The Court identified a second, wholly independent reason for
the failure of the respondents' federal claim: the protesters did
not intend to deprive of a right insured against private infringement.138 Justice Scalia noted that both the respondents and the
lower courts relied upon the right to interstate travel to support
their § 1985(3) claim.139 The Justice admitted that this right has
been held to be protected against private encroachment. 40 Justice
Scalia concluded, however, that the district court's finding that
many women travel interstate to obtain abortions in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area was insufficient to support a § 1985 (3)
4
claim.' '

State's ability to "make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to
implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds." Id. at 474. The Court
maintained that Connecticut's regulation did not preclude a pregnant woman from
obtaining an abortion. Id. Rather, Justice Powell propounded, an indigent woman is
not disadvantaged by the regulation; she must continue to rely on private services to
obtain an abortion. Id. Therefore, the Court held that the State regulation did not
interfere with the fundamental right announced in Roe. Id. (footnote omitted).
Justice Powell further determined that the Connecticut regulation satisfied the
rationality test. Id. at 478. The Court averred that the State indisputably had a legitimate interest in promoting childbirth. Id. (quotation and footnote omitted). Further, the Justice articulated, the Connecticut regulation unquestionably advanced that
interest. Id. Justice Powell stressed that the Court's decision did not prohibit states
from subsidizing non-therapeutic abortions. Id. at 480. Rather, the Justice emphasized, the Court decided only that states are not under a constitutional obligation to
fund such abortions. Id.
135 Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 761-62 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102
(1971)). The Court also provided a definition of invidious: "'[t]ending to excite
odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense; esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating."' Id. (citation omitted).
136 Id. at 762.
137 Id. (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; Harris, 448 U.S. at 325). Justice Scalia observed that Congress has, with the Supreme Court's endorsement, disfavored abortion in the allocation of federal funding for medical procedures. Id. (citing Maher,
432 U.S. at 474; Harris, 448 U.S. at 325).
138 Id. (citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters &Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFLCIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)). See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text
(discussing Carpenters).
139 Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 762.
140 Id. (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06) (citations omitted).
141 Id. The majority asserted that the only connection between the petitioners' actions and the right to interstate travel was the district court's finding that
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The Court maintained that it is not enough for a right to be
concomitantly affected. 14 2 To the contrary, Justice Scalia contended, the right must be aimed at by the conspirators. 143 The Justice asserted that the respondents would have had to show that the
protesters knowingly and deliberately hindered their right to interstate travel. 144 There was nothing in the record, the Justice observed, to demonstrate that it was the protesters' conscious
objective to deprive the respondents of their right to interstate
travel. 145
Justice Scalia identified a third reason why the respondents
did not demonstrate a conspiracy to infringe upon the right to interstate travel: the petitioners' "rescues" would not impress upon
that right. 1 46 The Court stressed that the right to interstate travel
does not change state-law torts into federal crimes merely because
they are committed against interstate travelers. 147 In this case, the
Court noted, the only tangible restraints to movement that would
have been created by the proposed "rescues" would have occurred
at the abortion clinics themselves. 148 Justice Scalia argued that
such a barrier restricted movement only from one section of Virginia to another. 1 49 The Justice averred that this purely intrastate
"'[s]ubstantial numbers of women seeking the services of [abortion] clinics in the
Washington Metropolitan area travel interstate to reach the clinics.'" Id. (quoting
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (1989)).
The Court looked to the criminal counterpart of § 1985(3) for guidance. Id.
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 241). The majority quoted:
[A] conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not, of itself, violate
§ 241. But if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede
or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a
person because of his exercise of that fight, then .

.

. the conspiracy

becomes a proper object of the federal law ....
Id. (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966)) (footnote omitted).
142 Id.
143 Id. (quoting Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833).
144 Id. The Court stressed that this intent to deprive of a right requires more than
awareness or acceptance of the deprivation. Id. at 763. Rather, Justice Scalia insisted,
the defendant must act in order to effectuate the deprivation. Id. (footnote omitted).
145 Id. The Court contended that interstate travel is irrelevant to the petitioners'
opposition to abortion. Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. The majority enumerated two protections offered by the guarantee of interstate travel. Id. First,Justice Scalia observed that interstate travelers are shielded from
"'the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement.'" Id. (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982)). Second, the Court narrated, the guarantee of
interstate travel safeguards interstate travelers' right not to be "'treated differently'
from intrastate travelers." Id. (quoting Zobe4 457 U.S. at 60 n.6) (other citations
omitted).
148 Id.
149 Id.
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restriction would implicate the guarantee of interstate travel only if
it was employed discriminatorilyagainst the interstate travelers.15 0
Shifting from the right to interstate travel to the right to abortion, the Court announced that this latter right was also insufficient
to support a § 1985(3) claim.15 1 Conceding that the right to abortion was most certainly "aimed at" by the petitioners, Justice Scalia
pronounced that the divestiture of this right could not be the goal
of a private conspiracy.' 52 The Justice explained that the statute
can only be invoked against conspiracies that target rights safeguarded from not only official but also private infringement.1 55
Justice Scalia observed that there are very few rights that are proThe right to abortected against such private encroachment.'
tion, the Justice continued, is not included in this selective
group.1 55 Rather, the majority submitted, the right to abortion is
part of the broader, more general rights of privacy or liberty, which
are not defended against private encroachment. 156 Therefore, the
respondents' deprivation claim under the statute failed, the Justice
posited, because it did not identify a right that was both protected
57
against private interference and targeted by the conspiracy.'
150 Id.

The Court's conclusion that the restriction was not applied discriminatorily

against interstate travelers was buttressed by the fact that the respondents conceded as
much at oral argument. Id. (footnote omitted).
151 Id. at 764.
152 Id.
153 Id. (quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610,
AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)).
154 Id. The Court noted that "only the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free
from involuntary servitude" and the guarantee of interstate travel within the context
of the Thirteenth Amendment are protected against private infringement. Id. (citing
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 759 (1966) (citations omitted)).
155 Id. The Court speculated that it would be strange to endow the right to abortion with such extensive protection considering that the right is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution. Id.
156 Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-05 (1992)).
157 Id. After outlining its reasons for refusing to apply § 1985(3) to the petitioners'
.rescues," the majority challenged the reasoning and conclusions of the dissents. See
id. at 764-67. First, Justice Scalia chided the two Justices for reaching the hindrance
clause of § 1985(3). Id. at 764-65. The majority summarized the "extraordinary" steps
the dissentingJustices were forced to take to reach the hindrance clause issue, i.e., the
Justices saw claims that were not in the complaint, decided an issue neither presented
to nor ruled on by the courts below, ignored the questions presented in the Petition
for Certiorari, and, finally, punished both parties for not speaking to an issue on
which the Court refused additional briefing. Id. at 765 (citations and footnote
omitted).
The Court would have expressed some degree of understanding with the dissenters' unorthodox consideration of the hindrance clause, Justice Scalia alluded, had the
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The Court declined to answer the question whether the pendent state-law claims were sufficient to warrant the injunction; the
issue was left for consideration on remand. 15 In conclusion, Justice Scalia mentioned that trespassing and intentionally obstructing access to private property are unlawful in most, if not all,
states.15 9 The Justice emphasized that the fact that these actions
are crimes does not transform them into federal offenses merely
because their purpose is to thwart abortions. 16 0 The Court reversed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remanded the case for further consideration. 6 '
Justice Kennedy concurred with the judgment of the Court,
but wrote separately to highlight another federal statute available
to victims of organized lawless behavior.' 6 2 The Justice reported
the merits of 42 U.S.C. § 10501, under which state officials may
request assistance from federal law enforcement officers when federally guaranteed rights are in danger.1 6 3 Thus, the Justice underscored, notwithstanding the decision in the case at hand, the
respondents were not without federal remedy, should local author16 4
ities request such assistance.
Justice Souter, who concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, maintained that the interpretation of the deprivation and prevention clauses of § 1985(3) was central to the
resolution of the case subjudice.'6 5 The Justice concluded that the
limiting conditions placed on the former clause by the majority
were inapplicable to the latter clause.' 66 Furthermore, Justice Souclause clearly been violated. Id. The majority opined that the violation was anything
but clear. Id. The Court interpreted the hindrance clause in the same manner as the
deprivation clause and concluded that both clauses required a "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Id. The majority repeated its earlier finding of a lack of
any such class-based intent. Id. Reiterating the requirement that the conspiracy must
target rights protected against private as well as official infringement, Justice Scalia
reasoned that the hindrance clause claim must fail for this reason as well. Id. at 766.
Finally, the Court vehemently disagreed with the dissenters' conclusion that it was the
purpose of the "rescuers" to hinder law enforcement. Id. at 767.
158 Id. at 768.
159
160
161

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 768, 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10501). If this statute
were invoked, Justice Kennedy remarked, the decision to call in federal resources
would be one for the Executive rather than the Judicial Branch. Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 769 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra note 7
(providing the text of these two clauses).
166 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 775 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162
163
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ter claimed that the facts supported a finding that the protesters
violated the hindrance clause, thereby creating a cause of action
under § 1985(3).67
In contrast to the majority, Justice Souter submitted that the
phrase common to both the deprivation and hindrance clauses"equal protection of the laws"-should be given an independent
reading. 68 The reasons for applying these conditions to the deprivation clause, Justice Souter contended, are inapplicable to the
hindrance clause.1 6 9 The Justice argued that if the limitations were
used to circumscribe the reach of the hindrance clause, the clause
would be rendered ineffective against conspiracies it was clearly intended to cover."' ° Justice Souter argued that the conspiracy in the
present case was within Congress's intended scope of the statute.1 7 '
Justice Souter maintained that the condition that actionable conspiracies be prompted by an intent to deny equal protection of the
laws was the chief restraint placed on the scope of § 1985(3).172
Moreover, Justice Souter found fault with the Court's decision
in Griffin.17 In all likelihood, the Justice maintained, Congress in167 Id. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
criticized the majority's finding that the hindrance clause was not properly before the
Court. Id. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because the
respondents' complaint merely alleged that the petitioners colluded with each other
to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to privacy, the Justice contended
that their cause of action was not confined to the deprivation clause. Id. (citation and
footnote omitted).
168 Id. at 771 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. The Justice observed that the petitioners planned to overpower law enforcement officers and preclude them from safeguarding a class of victims who were
merely trying to exercise a constitutional liberty. Id.
172 Id. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
quoted the sponsor of the amendment to demonstrate that the purpose of the statute
was to preserve equality. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1871)
(statement of Rep. Shellabarger)). Representative Shellabarger stated:
The object of the amendment is. .. to confine the authority of this law
to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of
rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus
and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may
not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens'
rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of this section.
CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
173 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)). In attempting to respect the
circumscriptive intent of the 42nd Congress, the Justice alleged, the Griffin Court's
narrowing of the deprivation clause verged on "overkill." Id. Furthermore, Justice
Souter criticized the Griffin Court for adding this class-based animus restriction to the
statute without any clear showing that this was what Congress intended. Id. (citations
omitted).
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tended the statute's equal protection phrase to be given the same
meaning as the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection language.17 4 Justice Souter explained that under the Equal Protection
Clause, all classifications, whether premised on a racial or otherwise class-based "invidiously discriminatory animus" or not, are susceptible to examination. 175 The Justice concluded that any
impermissible classification under the Equal Protection Clause
should give rise to a cause of action under § 1985(3).176 Finally,
Justice Souter commented, there is evidence in the legislative history to suggest that the absence of any allusion to race in § 1985(3)
was the result of a conscious decision, not of inadvertence.1 77 The
Justice further concluded that the Griffin and Carpenters decisions
clause and left it more distripped away much of the deprivation
178
minished than Congress intended.
TheJustice next addressed the question of whether the rationale supporting a narrow reading of the deprivation clause pertains
to the hindrance clause.1 79 Justice Souter submitted that these justifications were not applicable.1 80 Because of the already narrow
174 Id. The statute, Justice Souter recounted, was passed just three years after the
amendment was ratified. Id. The Justice could fathom no reason why the equal protection provision in the statute should be interpreted any more narrowly than its
counterpart in the amendment. Id.
175 Id. at 773 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). Nowhere, the Justice remarked, does the Equal Protection Clause refer to race.
Id. TheJustice pointed out that customary legislative classifications are subject only to
rational basis scrutiny. Id. (citations omitted).
176 Id.
177 Id. In support of this conclusion, the Justice quoted Senator Edmunds, who
remarked that "if there were a conspiracy against a person 'because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or
because he was a Vermonter... then this section could reach it.'" Id. (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871) (statement of Sen. Edmunds)) (footnote
omitted). These examples, Justice Souter commented, were not based on classes
analogous to race. Id. (footnote omitted).
178 Id. at 775 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Carpenters,
Justice Souter alleged, the Court moved beyond Griffin by holding that a plaintiff
must allege that the defendant's ultimate goal was to infringe upon a constitutional
right guaranteed against private interference. Id. at 774 (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)). The Justice maintained
that this was an important step, one in which the Court created a more narrow ambit
for the clause than Congress intended. Id. The Justice voiced skepticism that Congress had intended only to preserve the rights already protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment. Id. Had that been the contemplated meaning of the statute, Justice
Souter argued, the drafters would have said so explicitly. Id. The Justice interjected
that Congress did just that in the third and fourth clauses of § 1985(3), which concerned voting rights already protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.
179 Id. at 775 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180 Id. While Justice Souter could find no basis for the Griffin Court's choice of a
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scope of conspiracies qualifying under the hindrance clause, the
Justice concluded, its "equal protection of the laws" language
should be read in no more restrictive a manner than the Four1 81
teenth Amendment.
Turning to Carpenters' requirement that the federal right
targeted must be protected against both private and official interference, Justice Souter opined that this requirement was also inapplicable to the hindrance clause. 18 2 The Justice claimed that this
condition should not be imported onto the hindrance clause because the very act of overwhelming government officials represents
state action. 83 The Justice announced that the hindrance clause
should apply to a conspiracy to thwart the government's ability to
provide "equal protection of the laws," even absent a race or otherwise class-based animus and an object of breaching a constitutional
right protected only from state action.1 8 4
In applying the hindrance clause to the case at hand, Justice
Souter concluded that a conspiracy that attempts to prevent law
enforcement officials from safeguarding women's right to abortion
falls within the purview of the clause. 8 5 The Justice reached this
conclusion based on the judgment that the classification could not
pass the rationality test, i.e., the classification does not bear any
racial or analogous class-based animus requirement to limit the scope of § 1985(3),
the Justice acknowledged the need to restrict the number of actionable conspiracies
under the deprivation clause. Id. Textually, the Justice opined, no restriction was
placed on the scope of the deprivation clause other than the requirement that the
conspiracy threaten equal protection of the law. Id. Absent some form of court imposed restriction on the deprivation clause, Justice Souter agreed, the statute would
become exactly what the Griffin Court feared-"'a general federal tort law.'" Id.
(quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
The Justice, however, differentiated the hindrance clause from the deprivation
clause. Id. Justice Souter emphasized an element unique to the hindrance clause
which materially diminishes its scope. Id. The Justice maintained that a private plot
to cause harm is insufficient under the hindrance clause and, in addition, the conspiracy must be forceful enough to subvert the ability of authorities to enforce the law.
Id. The Justice asserted that an expansive conspiratorial goal would be required in
today's world. Id. at 775-76 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181 Id. at 776 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182 Id. (citing Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833).
183 Id. The Justice stated that the "relevant point here is that the whole basis of the
Griffin Court's analysis was that 'interference with or influence on state authorities'
was state action." Id. (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 98). Justice Souter maintained that
the Griffin Court intended the state interference requirement to apply to the hindrance clause alone. Id. The Justice remarked that a separate state action requirement would be duplicative because "interference with or influence upon state
authorities" constituted state action in itself. Id.
184 Id. at 776-77 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185 Id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
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186
relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.
In dissent,' 8 7 Justice Stevens found that the judgments of the
lower courts were buttressed by the text of § 1985(3), the statute's
legislative history, and the Court's precedent.' 8 8 The Justice asserted that the protesters' conspiracy was designed to, and in fact
did, encumber the respondents' right to interstate travel.' 9 Additionally, the Justice contended that the plain language of § 1985(3)
was expansive enough to embrace the petitioners' "rescues" 90 be186 Id. (citation omitted). The Justice outlined the district court's findings that the
petitioners conspired to close the clinics, trespassed, obstructed ingress to and egress
from the clinics, and overwhelmed the police force, creating a period in which police
protection was inadequate to protect the respondents' persons and property. Id. at
778-79 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter claimed
that these findings of fact were indicative of the petitioners' intent to "prevent" or
"hinder" law enforcement officials from providing "equal protection of the laws." Id.
at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, Justice
Souter concluded, these findings were not express, and therefore "the decision of the
Court of Appeals should be vacated and the case be remanded for consideration of
purpose." Id.
187 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Blackmun. Id.
188 Id. The Justice condemned the Court for disregarding the manifest intent of
§ 1985(3) to prevent organized mobs from appropriating individuals' constitutional
rights. Id. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent cited with approval the district
court's finding that the protesters "'engaged in this conspiracy for the purpose, either
directly or indirectly, of depriving women seeking abortions and related medical and
counselling services, of the right to travel.'" Id. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (E.D. Va.
1989).
The Justice distinguished the petitioners' conduct from ordinary trespass or anything approximating pacifistic picketing. Id. Rather, Justice Stevens charged, the
"rescues" exhibited a modern instance of the type of fanatical, politically driven, unlawful behavior that inspired Congress to pass the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871. Id.
190 Id. The Justice observed that the "rescues" occurred both on the public "'highway'" and the private "'premises of another.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988)). Justice Stevens noted that the women at whom the blockades were aimed
were most certainly within "'any person or class of persons."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)). Finally, the Justice opined, by frustrating government authorities' ability
to protect women seeking access to the clinics, the petitioners, either "'directly or
indirectly,'" divested the women of equal protection and their guarantee of interstate
travel. Id. at 782-83 (StevensJ, dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
Had the Court confined its analysis to the text of the statute, Justice Stevens hypothesized, it would have affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Id. at 783
(StevensJ, dissenting). The Justice denounced the majority for ignoring the history,
purpose, and plain language of the statute, and instead relying on inapplicable judicial precedent. Id. In Collins, Griffin, and Carpenters, the Justice averred, the Court
gave § 1985(3) a narrow construction in order to eschew perceived constitutional
maladies inherent in the statute. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Stevens maintained,
however, that granting a remedy to women attempting to exercise their right to travel
interstate to obtain an abortion creates no peril of mutating § 1985(3) into a general
federal tort law. Id. at 784-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cause nothing in the text of the statute precludes any cognizable
class of individuals from receiving the benefit of "equal protection
of the laws.""' Furthermore, the Justice attested, the reading
given § 1985(3) by the Griffin Court did not exclude discrimination
19 2
based on gender from the statute's purview.
Justice Stevens debated the majority's declaration that a classbased animus could be found only if: (1) opposition to abortion
can be reasonably presumed to signify gender-based intent; or (2)
intent is immaterial.1 9 3 Even accepting the Court's two-pronged
characterization of class-based animus, however, the dissent concluded that both types of animus were present in the case at
hand. 19 4 The dissent opined that a determination of a class-based
animus does not necessitate the conclusion that simple opposition
to abortion demonstrates prejudice against women as a class.1 5
Justice Stevens expounded that because women are "unquestionably" a class worthy of protection, the class-based animus requisite is
fulfilled if the conspiracy targets an activity in which only members
of the class have the capability to engage. 9 6 The Justice explained
that the effect on the protected class does not have to be the exclusive object of the conspiracy. 197 Rather, Justice Stevens maintained, it is sufficient that the conspiracy be induced at least
partially by the unfavorable result it will have on the class.' 9 8
191 Id. at 785 (StevensJ, dissenting). While conceding that the statute was enacted
in 1871 in large measure to protect the nation's newly emancipated citizens, Justice
Stevens reported that the Act's protection was to extend to all the nation's citizens.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 484 (1871)).

192 Id.

Id. at 785-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 760). Justice Stevens interpreted the first proposition to indicate animosity or hostility. Id. at 786 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Using Griffin to refute the Court's premise, Justice Stevens proclaimed
that it was immaterial that the defendants, in addition to preventing African-Americans from pursuing their rights, also objected to desegregation and African-American
suffrage. Id. Similarly, the Justice posited, the Griffin Court did not demand that the
plaintiffs prove that the assaults made upon them were inspired by hostility towards
African-Americans. Id. In response to the Court's second proposition, that a discriminatory animus can be proven only if intent is irrelevant, Justice Stevens reminded the
majority that Congress can offer more protection in a statute than is provided in the
Constitution. Id.
194 Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 Id. In fact, the Justice continued, the conspirators need not be driven by animosity toward individual women to meet the class-based animus requirement of the
statute. Id.
193

196 Id.
197 Id.

198 Id. (citations omitted). In the case at hand, the Justice proffered, the petitioners intended their conduct to prevent the performance of abortions. Id. Justice Stevens emphasized that the petitioners' initial objective was to influence the behavior of
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Turning to a discussion of discriminatory effects, Justice Stevens differentiated between statutory and constitutional claims. 9 9
The Justice acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment requires discriminatory intent, but refused to place a similar condition on a claim under § 1985(3).2o0 Justice Stevens asserted that
the difference between individuals who oppose abortion and individuals who use violence to force abortion clinics to close is more
than semantic. 20 1 That the petitioners' conduct leads to discrimi22
natory effects, Justice Stevens submitted, is unquestionable. 1
The dissent stressed that the respondents' claim arose in a statutory rather than a constitutional context. 20 The Justice exwomen, regardless of the fact that their ultimate mission may have been to prevent
abortion and reverse its legalization. Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, the dissent argued, women are the objects of the petitioners' "rescues" "because of their sex, specifically, because of their capacity to become pregnant and to have an abortion." Id.
(footnote omitted).
The dissent hypothesized that the petitioners' unlawful behavior was also motivated by their belief that women are incapable of deciding whether to carry a fetus to
term. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The petitioners' activities, the Justice
stressed, were implemented to deprive all women of a right that belongs to women
alone. Id. Justice Stevens averred that this conspiracy, with its blatant disregard of the
law and its vehement interference with women's constitutional rights, was illustrative
of exactly the type of conduct that the drafters of the statute attempted to prevent. Id.
(footnote omitted).
Shifting to the Court's equal protection analysis, Justice Stevens criticized the
majority for creating an exception for rational class-based discrimination. Id. The
Court, Justice Stevens admonished, confused lawful opposition to abortion with the
violent usurpation of constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 788-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice articulated that when Congress passed § 1985 (3), it was asking
the Court to recognize that these so called "rational" reasons are nothing more than
excuses used to disguise and perpetuate discrimination. Id. at 789 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
199 Id.
200 Id. Justice Stevens clarified the holding in Geduldig. See id. (citing Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)). See supra note 130 (discussing the Geduldig decision).
That case, the Justice warned, did not hold that "a classification based on pregnancy is
gender-neutral." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent opined
that all that Geduldig established was that not every classification based on pregnancy
was comparable to the classifications invalidated in Frontieroand Reed. Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). Justice
Stevens noted that a central tenet of the Geduldig holding was the Court's belief that
the disability insurance policy bestowed benefits equally on males and females. Id.
(footnote omitted).
201 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 790 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 (1977)) (footnote omitted). TheJustice accused the petitioners of forming a "mob that seeks to impose a burden on women by forcibly preventing
the exercise of a right that only women possess." Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. The Justice explained that in constitutional cases, the Court applies an intent standard in deciding whether the Constitution has been breached. Id. at 790-91
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In contrast, Justice Stevens stated, the "class-based animus
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plained that the roles of the intent standard and the class-based
animus test vary depending upon whether the violation is constitutional or statutory.2 °4 The Justice then proffered that there is no
reason to impute the rigorous criteria applied to a claim arising
under the Constitution to one arising under § 1985(3).205
Justice Stevens next offered his belief that laws that encumber
pregnant women discriminate on the basis of sex. 20 6 The Justice
submitted that this is true because the capability of becoming pregnant is the inherited and immutable trait that fundamentally distinguishes females from males.2 7 Justice Stevens argued that this
conclusion should guide the courts' interpretation and application
of civil rights legislation.20 8
Next, Justice Stevens asserted that the right to interstate travel
cannot be severed from the rights the respondents sought to exercise. 20 9 The Justice agreed with the district court's finding that the
petitioners intended to hinder the federal guarantee of interstate
travel.2 1 ° The dissent elaborated that by rendering abortion clinics
inaccessible, the protesters encumbered interstate travel that was
Jusengaged in for the single purpose of obtaining an abortion.
tice Stevens alleged that the obstruction of interstate travel was the
foreseeable and natural outcome of the "rescues."21 2
test" is employed in § 1985(3) cases to ascertain whether the already established violation can be remedied. Id. at 791 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. (quotation omitted).
208 Id. The Justice found affirmation for this view in the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)). Justice Stevens argued that the Act
unequivocally communicates Congress's judgment that "'discrimination based on a
woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.'" Id. (quoting
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983)). The dissent next quoted Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls, in which the Court held that a policy that precluded "all women
capable of bearing children" from jobs which would expose them to lead was discriminatory on its face. Id. at 791-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)).
209 Id. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210 Id. In fact, Justice Stevens opined, because the petitioners' ultimate objective is
the abolition of all abortion facilities in the country, it is imperative that they obstruct
women's access to abortion in other States. Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. Justice Stevens criticized the majority's reading of United States v. Guest. Id. at
792-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)).
The dissent argued that nowhere in the Guest opinion did the Court imply that the
right to interstate travel bars only restrictions that discriminate against out-of-state
residents. Id. at 793 (Stevens,J., dissenting). The dissent also reproved the Court for
failing to differentiate between a criminal and a civil statute. Id. (citing id. at 762; 18
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Addressing the second clause of § 1985(3), the hindrance provision, the Justice concluded that the respondents were undeniably
entitled to relief under this provision.2 13 Justice Stevens conceded
that the right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy is a right
protected only against state interference. 2 14 By preventing government authorities from protecting the pursuit of that right, however, Justice Stevens pronounced that the petitioners rendered
their conspiracy redressable under § 1985(3) .215 The Justice enunciated that a conspiracy to hinder the government's ability to secure constitutionally protected rights involves the State to a
significant degree and therefore creates a claim under the
statute.2 16
The Justice turned next to application of the class-based animus requirement to the hindrance clause.2 17 Justice Stevens noted
that the Griffin Court restricted its holding to the statute's deprivation clause and thus concluded that Griffin's reasoning was inapplicable to the hindrance clause.2 18 Accordingly, Justice Stevens
opined that it is wholly irrational to give the second clause a diverU.S.C. § 241 (1988)). TheJustice commented that it was improper to incorporate the
strict scienter requirement of the criminal statute in Guest into the civil statute in Bray.
Id. (footnote omitted). The dissent found further fault with the Court's determination that an impediment to interstate travel is legitimate as long as intrastate travelers
are equally hindered. Id. at 795 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Stevens professed that discrimination is a component of the class-based animus requirement, not of the obstruction of a woman's guarantee of interstate travel. Id.
213 Id. at 795, 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens claimed that the record
was replete with evidence of the petitioners' successful attempts to overwhelm local
law enforcement. Id. at 796 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice maintained that the
authorities were rendered impotent during the "rescues" and that, as a result, mob
violence triumphed. Id. (citing National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Operation Rescue,
726 F. Supp. 1483, 1489-90 & n.4 (E.D. Va. 1989)). Justice Stevens submitted that it
was exactly this type of conspiracy that the hindrance clause of § 1985(3) was intended to contravene. Id.
214

Id.

Id. (citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters &Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFLCIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830 (1983); Great Am. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366, 384 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
215

216

Id.

See id. Justice Stevens acknowledged that the Court had never been presented
with this precise issue, but contended that there had been occasion to consider the
applicability of the requirement to another portion of the Ku Klux Klan Act,
§ 1985(2). Id. The Justice recounted that the Court did not impose the Griffin requirement on § 1985(2). Id. (quoting Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 723 (1983)).
Justice Stevens inferred from Kush that Griffin's class-based animus requirement,
drafted for the deprivation clause of § 1985(3), should not narrow the dissimilar second clause of the statute. Id. at 796-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Kush, 460 U.S.
at 726).
218 Id. at 797 (StevensJ, dissenting) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
99 (1971)).
217
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gent and more contrived reading. 219 The Justice reiterated that
there is simply no danger of the hindrance clause becoming a general federal tort law, even absent the class-based animus
22 0
requirement.
Therefore, Justice Stevens reasoned that large-scale conspiracies preventing government officials from protecting one class's
constitutionally protected rights should be covered by the hindrance clause.2 2 In conclusion, the Justice maintained that Bray
was not about opposition to abortion at all, but about the exercise
of federal power to curb nationwide conspiracies to engage in un222
lawful conduct.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Blackmun, also dissented,
averring that § 1985(3) extends to the respondents' injuries and
the petitioners' conduct. 223 The dissent criticized the majority for
relying upon an "element" of § 1985(3) that cannot be found
within the text of the statute.22 4 Justice O'Connor agreed with the
majority that the narrowing interpretation given § 1985(3) by the
Griffin Court was a sound attempt to preserve the text of the statute
without allowing it to become a general federal tort law. 22 5' The
Id.
Id. Justice Stevens next contended that it would be reasonable to hold that the
clause prohibits conspiracies to hinder the government from protecting activities
unique to a protected class. Id. This would be true, the Justice maintained, even
where the conspirators' animus was directed not at the class but at the activity. Id.
219
220

221 Id. Such conduct, the Justice maintained, reaches as close to the core of the
statute's scope as possible. Id.
222 Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice admonished the Court for assuming that the case was about opposition to abortion. Id. Justice Stevens submitted that
this erroneous conclusion contaminated the Court's reasoning throughout the entire
opinion. Id.
223 Id. at 799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Justice conceded that the initial purpose of the statute was to deter prejudice against African-Americans, but argued that
the text of the Act is more inclusive than the historical situation that stimulated it. Id.
(citations omitted). The Justice stressed that § 1985(3) was written in general language. Id. Historically, Justice O'Connor noted, the Court has interpreted Reconstruction Era civil rights legislation as broadly as the language will allow. Id. (citing
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
97 (1971);Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968)). The Justice denounced the Court for contradicting this precedent and refusing to apply a statute to
a situation it was designed to cover. Id.
224 Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's analysis of Griffin). Justice O'Connor submitted that
the Court clung vehemently to the language in Griffin that requires a class-based animus as part of a § 1985(3) cause of action. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The Justice, on the other hand, would have considered not only Griffin's
limiting phrase but also the reasons the Court added the phrase as an element of a
§ 1985(3) cause of action. Id.
225 Id.
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Justice, however, viewed the class-based animus requirement as a
shorthand description of the kind of conduct Congress was trying
to prohibit, not an all-inclusive list of protected classes.22 6
The Justice could find no distinguishing factor between the
Ku Klux Klan activities originally targeted by § 1985(3) and the
protesters' activities in the present case.22 7 Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's conclusion that women seeking abortions are no more than the aggregate of victims of the tortious
activity. 228 Rather, the Justice asserted that the targets of the
protesters' conspiracy were a clearly identifiable class before any
tortious action took place.22 9 Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice
Stevens that the language of § 1985(3) offers no support for precluding any identifiable class of persons from receiving equal protection of the law. 230 The Justice opined that, at a minimum, the
classes that warrant heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be defended by
§ 1985(3) .231 Justice O'Connor noted that
gender-based classifica23 2
tions trigger such heightened scrutiny.
Because women are a protected class under the statute, Justice
O'Connor argued, § 1985(3) must cover conspiracies motivated by
characteristics possessed exclusively by that class.23 3 The Justice
maintained that the victims of the protesters' tortious activities
226 Id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United Brotherhood of
Carpenters &Joiners of Am., Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 851 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
227 Id. Justice O'Connor alleged that in both cases, the actors "'intended to hinder
a particular group in the exercise of their legal rights because of their membership in
a specific class.'" Id. (quoting Carpenters,463 U.S. at 854 (Blackmun,J., dissenting)).
228 Id. (quoting Carpenters,463 U.S. at 850 (citations omitted)). See supra notes 11517 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's conclusion that women seeking
abortions are not an identifiable class absent the tortious activity).
229 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Justice contended that
the targets were identifiable because of their "affiliation and activities." Id.
230 Id. (quoting id. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's assertion that § 1985(3) offers protection to
all cognizable classes).
231 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 801 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
232 Id. (citations omitted). As evidence of the special attention gender-based classifications deserve, the Justice asserted that all seven circuit courts addressing the issue
have found that women are a protected class under the statute. Id. (citations omitted). See supra note 67 (citing the various decisions of the federal circuit courts of
appeals). Justice O'Connor also quoted with approval Justice White, who remarked
in Novotny that "'[i] t is clear that sex discrimination may be sufficiently invidious to
come within the prohibition of § 1985(3).'" Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 801-02 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Great Am. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 389
n.6 (1979) (White, J., dissenting)).
233 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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were united by their biological capability of becoming pregnant
and their ability to abort their pregnancies. 23 4 Justice O'Connor
opined that because the petitioners' "rescues" were intimately related to these unique characteristics, the "rescues" were motivated
by the class-based animus required under Griffin.115 Justice
O'Connor asserted that the petitioners intended to aim at a protected class because of their class characteristics and to hinder
2 36
their enjoyment of their lawful personal and property rights.
The Justice submitted that Griffin's class-based animus requirement
should demand no more.2 3 7
Justice O'Connor stressed that the majority's overly detailed
examination of the words chosen by the Griffin Court should not
supersede Congress's purpose for enacting § 1985(3).238 Admonishing the Court for relying on cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Equal
Protection Clause applies to state actors, while the statute specifically addresses conspiracies engaged in by private actors. 23 9 The
Justice averred that because of this difference, the majority's reliance on Equal Protection cases was misplaced and erroneous.2 4 °
Justice O'Connor rejected the proposition that a § 1985(3) plaintiff must be held to the same invidious discrimination standard applied in Fourteenth Amendment cases. 24 1 Given the difference in
focus between the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1985(3), the Justice would apply a lower threshold in establishing a violation of the
statute than in establishing a violation of the Fourteenth
24 2
Amendment.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's assessment that using unlawful
methods to attain a goal is irrelevant in determining animus. Id. (quoting id. at 760).
238 Id. at 802-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
239 Id. at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
234
235
236
237

(1974)).
240 Id. Justice O'Connor observed that Congress has determined that a classification based on pregnancy is a classification based on gender. Id. (citing Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)) (other citation omitted). Moreover, the Justice narrated, Congress has recently indicated that a showing of discriminatory purpose is not always essential to prove statutory discrimination. Id. (citation
omitted).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 803-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Like Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor
concluded that abortion was not the issue in this case. Compare id. at 804 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) with id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's assertion that the case was not about abortion). The issue, the justice opined, was whether a federal cause of action arises when
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In addressing the hindrance clause of § 1985(3), Justice
O'Connor declared that this clause entitled the respondents to
seek the aid of a federal court.243 The Justice maintained that the
hindrance clause does not require that the conspiracy target rights
protected against private as well as official infringement. 24 4 Instead, the Justice averred, the clause prohibits conspiracies intended to impede law enforcement. 24 5 Justice O'Connor
concluded that the findings of the district court supported a holding that the petitioners' conspiracy was both class-based and
designed to obstruct law enforcement officials' ability to preserve
24 6
equal protection.
Because of the escalating violence that often accompanies
abortion protests and the inadequacy of state-law remedies to combat the problem, the Court should have followed the lead of the
courts of appeals and provided a federal remedy under
§ 1985(3).247 The Court unnecessarily restricted the scope of the
statute, and did so without any clear mandate of legislative intent.2 48 Rather, as was often pointed out by the dissenters in Bray
and the circuits that recognized a cause of action under § 1985(3)
in the abortion protest context, Congress chose only to limit the
24 9
statute to deprivations of "equal protection of the laws."
Therefore, the Court should have recognized that women are
a private conspiracy to deprive a protected class of its legal rights is created. Bray, 113
S. Ct. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that a federal cause of
action does arise in such a situation. Id.
243 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 805 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
247 See Foster, supra note 13, at 782 (asserting that state law remedies are less effective than federal remedies in enjoining Operation Rescue). But see Horizon Health
Center v. Felicissimo, No. A-63, 1994 WL 117098 (N.J. Apr. 6, 1994); Murray v. Lawson, Nos. A-42, A-65, 1994 WL 117097 (N.J. Apr. 6, 1994); Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center, 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), infra note 273 (enforcing state law
injunctions against anti-abortion protesters); Gardey, supra note 5, at 743 (arguing
that because anti-abortion protesters violate state law, state courts rather than federal
courts should mete out punishment).
248 Indeed, the statements of Senator Edmunds support the inclusion of all classes
within the statute's purview. See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871) (statement of Sen. Edmunds). See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing the
legislative history of § 1985(3)).
249 Justice Souter asserted that the "principal curb placed on the statute's scope was
the requirement that actionable conspiracies.., be motivated by a purpose to deny
equal protection of the laws." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See supra note 165-86 and accompanying text (discussingJustice Souter's concurrence); see also supra notes 223-46 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent).
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a class under § 1985(3) .250 The fact that Operation Rescue does
not target all women does not negate a finding of animus based on
gender. 2 51 Anti-abortion protesters target women who exercise
their right to obtain an abortion; these women possess this right
because they are women and because they have the physical capability to become pregnant.2 52 Congress has acknowledged that
250 The class of women possesses "immutable characteristics" and has been the subject of historically "pervasive discrimination." See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savs. &
Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979).
One commentator argued that § 1985(3) is "nothing more than an extension of
the [F] ourteenth [A]mendment." Schindler, supra note 40, at 107. Because classifications based on gender receive heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, such an analysis would afford women protection under § 1985(3) as well. See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). See supra note 72 (analyzing the
Frontiero decision).
Just over a year after the Bray Court decided that women were not a class for
purposes of § 1985(3), the Court examined whether the Equal Protection Clause
proscribes gender discrimination in the peremptory challenge context. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., No. 92-1239, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 3121 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1994). Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court inJE.B., held that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality." Id. at *4. The Court declared
that "[a]ll persons, when granted the opportunity to serve on ajury, have the right not
be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that
reflect and reinforce patterns of historical discrimination." Id. at *25. The Court's
holding in J.E.B. lends further support to the proposition that Bray was wrongly
decided.
251 Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624, 632 (11 th Cir. 1992)
(Kravitch, J., dissenting).
252 See id. (footnote omitted). The Eleventh Circuit held in Lucero that the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the defendants were motivated by a gender-based animus. Id.
at 628. Rather, the court explained, the "defendants' actions were motivated by a
disapproval of a certain activity, namely the abortion of a fetus, and therefore were
designed to prevent individuals, women and men alike, from engaging in that activity." Id. In dissent, Judge Kravitch refuted the majority's conclusion, arguing:
The women who seek entry to [the abortion] clinic-and are thus the
objects of defendants' conspiracy-are linked by their ability to bear
children and to undergo abortion, abilities that are unique to them as
women. If they were not women they could not be pregnant and could
not seek abortions. Defendants are motivated by a desire to stop these
women, and those who champion them, from obtaining abortions. This
is the animus that drives the defendants to blockade clinics and refuse
doctors and patients entry to medical offices.... The majority's insistence that Operation Rescue opposes a "practice" that has nothing to
do with women brings abstraction to a new level of absurdity. It is impossible to sever the link between abortion and gender. Only women
can become pregnant and only women have abortions. For too long
women have been invisible in much of the law. The majority now erases
women from pregnancy, childbirth, and abortion as well.
Id. at 632 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Bray, concluded that women are a protected class
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gender and pregnancy are inseparable.25 3 So too should the
Court.
Alternatively, the Court could have, as the dissenters suggested, granted a remedy under the hindrance clause of
§ 1985(3).254 Operation Rescue's own literature reveals a purpose
to prevent or hinder law enforcement authorities from securing a
woman's right to obtain an abortion.25 5 Thus, the protesters conceded a violation of the hindrance clause, and the Court could
have granted the respondents relief even without holding that women are a protected class under § 1985(3).
As dissenting Justices Stevens and O'Connor correctly identified, this case is neither about abortion nor opposition to abortion.256 Rather, the issue that should have been examined was
whether the federal government should intervene when constitutionally protected rights are being abridged by private conspiracies.
Thus framed, the resolution of the question seems clear: federal
jurisdiction is proper when private actors deprive a class of people
under § 1985(3). Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Specifically, the
Justice asserted:
If women are a protected class under § 1985(3), and I think they are,
then the statute must reach conspiracies whose motivation is directly
related to characteristics unique to that class. The victims of petitioners' tortious actions are linked by their ability to become pregnant and
by their ability to terminate their pregnancies, characteristics unique to
the class of women. Petitioners' activities are directly related to those
class characteristics and therefore, I believe, are appropriately described
as class based within the meaning of our holding in Griffin.
Id.
253 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
254 Justice Stevens declared that the protesters had unequivocally violated
§ 1985(3)'s hindrance clause. Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 795 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Stevens's contention that the protesters' violation of the hindrance clause established a
cause of action under § 1985 (3)); see supra note 7 (discussing the hindrance clause of
§ 1985(3)); see also supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion stating that the respondents were entitled to federal
protection under the hindrance clause).
255 In his treatise on the organization he founded, Randall Terry beseeched Christians to participate in abortion protests. RANDALL A. TERRY, OPERATION RESCUE 198-99
(1988). Terry urged that if large numbers of people attended sit-ins, they could "totally clog the system. The police, the district attorney, the courts, and the jails are not
prepared or designed to deal with such huge numbers." Id. at 199 (emphasis in
original).
Terry advised "rescuers" not to bring any money for bond or bail to a "rescue."
Id. at 231. "By telling the authorities that no one is posting bond or bail, we force them
to jail all of us (which would place a crushing burden on the already overcrowded
penal system) or to release all of us." Id. (emphasis in original).
256 See supra notes 188-246 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens's and
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinions).
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of equal protection of the law or thwart law enforcement authorities' ability to secure such equal protection.
Just one year after denying abortion clinics a federal remedy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Court provided such relief in National Organizationfor Women, Inc. v. Scheidler.257 In Scheidler, NOW
sued the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN), Joseph Scheidler, and
other anti-abortion groups under the Sherman Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.258 The petitioners alleged
that the respondents were part of a nationwide conspiracy to close
abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering. 259 NOW furNo. 92-780, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 1143 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1994) (per curiam).
Id. at *6. 18 U.S.C. § 1962, entitled "Prohibited activities," provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of any unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in,
or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A
purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment,
and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control
of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful
under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to
one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not
confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors
of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). For a more in depth discussion of RICO in the abortion
protest context, see Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion
Protestersand the Economic Motive Requirement 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1341 (1990); John H.
Henn & Maria Del Monaco, Civil Rights and RICO: Stopping OperationRescue, 13 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 251 (1990).
259 Scheidler, 1994 U.S. LEXIS at *7-8. The petitioners claimed that the anti-abortion groups had engaged in extortion, a violation of the Hobbs Act. Id. at *8 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988)). The Hobbs Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of prop257
258

2140

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2096

ther claimed that the respondents' conspiracy had damaged the
abortion clinics' business and property interests. 2 °
Framing the issue as whether plaintiffs must demonstrate that
defendants acted with an economic purpose to state a claim under
RICO, the Scheidler Court held that the statute contains no such
requirement. 261 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous
Court, commenced by noting that no "economic motive" requirement appears in either § 1961 or § 1962(c).2 6 2 The Chief Justice
explained that § 1962(c) encompasses the activities of enterprises
that "affect" commerce.2 6 3 The Court determined that an enterprise can have a deleterious effect on commerce without a motivation to increase its profits. 26 4 Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist
refused to infer that because the term "enterprise" was used in
§ 1962, subsections (a) and (b), "economic motive" was required
by subsection (c).265 The Court declared that the text of subsections (a) and (b) demands only that the enterprise or its profits be
illegally created.2 6 6
The Chief Justice reasoned that the predicate acts required
erty from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2).
260 Scheidler, 1994 U.S. LEXIS at *8. The district court dismissed the petitioners'
complaint, holding that because Scheidler was a political adversary rather than a business rival, the Sherman Act did not apply. Id. at *9 (citing National Org. for Women,
Inc. v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 941 (N.D. Ill. 1991)). The court also dismissed the
petitioners' RICO claim. Id. Declaring that an economic motive requirement was
part of the statute, the district court determined that the petitioners' claim must fail
because they did not allege that the respondents acted with a "'profit-generating purpose.'" Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that
"'non-economic crimes committed in furtherance of non-economic motives'" fall
outside the scope of RICO. Id. at *9-10 (quoting National Organization for Women,
Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 625, 631 (7th Cir. 1992)). Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the federal appellate courts'
varying interpretations of RICO's "economic motive" requirement. Id. at *10 (citations omitted).
261 Id. at *6.
262 Id. at *14. Section 1962(c) renders it unlawful "for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
263 Scheidler, 1994 U.S. LEXIS at *15.
264 Id.
265 Id. at *16. The Court reasoned that because "the enterprise in subsection (c) is
not being acquired, it need-not have a property interest that can be acquired nor an
economic motive for engaging in illegal activity; it need only be an association in fact
that engages in a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at *1718.
266 Id. at *17.
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under RICO need not generate a profit for the protesters.2 6 7
Rather, the Court determined, the predicate act requirement is fulfilled when the economy is depleted and businesses such as abortion clinics are injured.2 6 8
The Court challenged the respondents' assertion that Congress intended to include an "economic motive" requirement in
the Act.26 9 Refuting the contention that Congress intended RICO
to extend only to organized crime, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that the statute's definition of enterprise seems to encompass both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. 27 ° The Court
concluded that the language of the statute was unambiguous and
that Congress did not demand that an enterprise have an economic motive.27 1 ChiefJustice Rehnquist determined that the petitioners should be given the opportunity to demonstrate that the
respondents engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, holding
only that RICO does not require an economic motive. 7 2
The Court has at last provided a federal remedy for the victims
Id. at *19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *19-20 (quotation omitted).
Id. at *20-21. The Court proffered that "'[t]he fact that RICO has been applied
in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.
It demonstrates breadth.'" Id. at *22-23 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984)).
272 Id. at *24. Joining in the majority opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote separately to demonstrate why the First Amendment did not compel the
Court to read an "economic motive" requirement into RICO. Id. (Souter,J., concurring). The concurrence also emphasized that the Court's holding did not prevent
protesters from contesting the statute's operation in specific cases. Id. at *24, *26
(Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter underscored that "nothing in the Court's
opinion precludes a RICO defendant from raising the First Amendment in its defense
in a particular case." Id. at *26 (Souter, J., concurring). Even if it were necessary to
read an "economic motive" requirement into RICO to avoid First Amendment issues,
the concurrence contended that such a requirement would do little to ensure the
protection of free speech. Id. at *26-27 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter
explained:
[A]n economic-motive requirement would protect too much with respect to First Amendment interests, since it would keep RICO from
reaching ideological entities whose members commit acts of violence we
need not fear chilling. An economic-motive requirement might also
prove to be underprotective, in that entities engaging in vigorous but
fully protected expression might fail the proposed economic-motive test
(for even protest movements need money) and so be left exposed to
harassing RICO suits.
An economic-motive requirement is, finally, unnecessary, because
legitimate free-speech claims may be raised and addressed in individual
RICO cases as they arise.
Id. at *26 (Souter, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Souter acknowledged that RICO
267
268
269
270
271
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of violent protests at abortion clinics throughout the nation. In the
past, state laws have done little to combat the lawlessness that often
accompanies highly organized and widespread abortion protests. 27 3 Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconcile Bray and Scheidler.
claims could discourage protected speech and warned courts applying the statute to
remain cognizant of this possibility. Id. at *28 (Souter, J., concurring).
273 See supranote 247 (discussing the inadequacy of state law remedies). States are,
however, taking steps to fill the void created by the federal government's inaction in
this arena. In Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo,for example, the NewJersey Supreme
Court upheld the Chancery Division's authority to issue an injunction restricting the
expressive activities of Helpers of God's Precious Infants (Helpers). Horizon Health
Ctr. v. Felicissimo, No. A-63, 1994 WL 117098, at *1 (N.J. April 6, 1994). Helpers
staged a full-scale demonstration on the sidewalk and street in front of the Horizon
Health Center (Center). Id. at *2. The masses of people made it difficult for patients
and staff to enter the Center, and, once they did, the noise from the protest infiltrated the clinic. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Clifford, writing for the unanimous
court, affirmed the Chancery Division's authority to enjoin the Helpers' nonviolent
expression. Id. at *4.
The court articulated that "[flor a content-based restriction in a traditional public
forum to be valid, the restriction must pass muster under the strictest scrutiny: it must
be 'necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.'" Id. at *6 (quotation omitted). Justice Clifford observed, however, that
"reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in traditional public forums are
valid" as long as they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored, further an important governmental objective, and do not foreclose alternate means of communication. Id.
The court determined that the injunction against Helpers was content neutral. Id. at
*8. Further, the justice declared, the maintenance of health is an important governmental objective. Id. at *9. Therefore, the court enunciated, New Jersey has a substantial interest in safeguarding access to clinics' medical services. Id. at *10.
The court concluded that the portions of the injunction prohibiting trespassing
and obstructing access to the Center were narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests. Id. at *13. By contrast, Justice Clifford submitted that the injunction's place restriction could be more narrowly drawn. Id. Finally, the court
articulated that the injunction, once modified, would afford Helpers sufficient alternative means of expression. Id. at *14. In closing, Justice Clifford noted that the
court decided the case under the First Amendment rather than the NewJersey Constitution. Id. at *15.
In a consolidated case decided the same day, the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld injunctions prohibiting anti-abortion groups from picketing within a specified
zone around two doctors' homes. Murray v. Lawson, Nos. A-42, A-65, 1994 WL
117097, at *1 (N.J. April 6, 1994). Following the reasoning of Horizon, the court concluded that the injunctions were content neutral. Id. at *6. Justice Clifford, again
writing for a unanimous court, further declared that the preservation of residential
privacy was an important governmental interest. Id. at *8. The justice pronounced
that the 300-foot restriction imposed by the district court in Murray v. Lawson was
narrowly tailored and therefore permissible. Id. at *11. Because the district court in
Boffard v. Barnes enjoined protesting within "the immediate vicinity of' the doctor's
residence, however, Justice Clifford remanded the case to the Chancery Division to
define the prohibition in more detail. Id. at *12 (quotation omitted). Finally, because the injunctions banned picketing only within the delineated zones, the court
averred that the defendants had sufficient alternative avenues of communication. Id.
Additionally, in Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center, the Florida Supreme
Court upheld a permanent injunction that restricted the activities of anti-abortion
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In Bray, the Court clung tenaciously to § 1985(3)'s legislative history and refused to look beyond the impetus behind the statute:
protection of the newly emancipated slaves.27 4 On the other hand,
the Scheidler Court did just the opposite, holding that on its face,
RICO contains no "economic motive" requirement. 275 These decisions are inherently inconsistent and may cause confusion when
the lower courts attempt to glean Congress's intent from legislative
history. More importantly, however, both the Court and Congress 276 should be applauded for finally recognizing that a federal
protesters. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Center, 626 So. 2d 664, 675 (Fla.
1993). Rejecting the protesters' First Amendment arguments, the court declared:
While the First Amendment confers on each citizen a powerful right to
express oneself, it gives the picketer no boon to jeopardize the health,
safety, and rights of others. No citizen has a right to insert a foot in the
hospital or clinic door and insist on being heard-while purposefully
blocking the door to those in genuine need of medical services. No
picketer can force speech into the captive ear of the unwilling and
disabled.
Id.
The Supreme Court granted certification and was scheduled to hear arguments
on the constitutionality of the permanent injunction on April 28, 1994. Larry Rohter,
Abortion Clinic Fight Heads to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at A16. Bruce Cadle,
Florida director of Operation Rescue, claimed that the case was "'not about abortion,
but the right of Christians to express their views in the public arena.'" Id. The Aware
Woman Center for Choice, on the other hand, argued that Operation Rescue's conduct was abusive and unprotected by the First Amendment. Id. The Court is expected to render its decision in late June, 1994. Id.
274 See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 759 (1993).
275 See Scheidler, 1994 U.S. LEXIS at *6.
276 On March 23, 1993, the Senate introduced a bill "[to] amend the Public Health
Service Act to permit individuals to have freedom of access to certain medical clinics
and facilities, and for other purposes." S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (to be
codified as Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act). Congress found that:
(1) medical clinics and other facilities offering abortion services
have been targeted in recent years by an interstate campaign of violence
and obstruction aimed at closing the facilities or physically blocking ingress to them, and intimidating those seeking to obtain or provide abortion services;
(2) as a result of such conduct, women are being denied access to,
and health care providers are being prevented from delivering, vital reproductive health services;
(3) such conduct subjects women to increased medical risks and
thereby jeopardizes the public health and safety;
(4) the methods used to deny women access to these services include blockades of facility entrances; invasions and occupations of the
premises; vandalism and destruction of property in and around the facility; bombings, arson, and murder; and other acts of force and threats
of force;
(5) those engaging in such tactics frequently trample police lines
and barricades and overwhelm State and local law enforcement
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authorities and courts and their ability to restrain and enjoin unlawful
conduct and prosecute those who have violated the law;
(6) such conduct operates to infringe upon women's ability to exercise full enjoyment of rights secured to them by Federal and State law,
both statutory and constitutional, and burdens interstate commerce, including by interfering with business activities of medical clinics involved
in interstate commerce and by forcing women to travel from States
where their access to reproductive health services is obstructed to other
States;
(7) prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic (No. 90-985, January 13, 1993), such conduct
was frequently restrained and enjoined by Federal courts in actions
brought under section 1980(3) of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C.
1985(3));
(8) in the Bray decision, the Court denied a remedy under such
section to persons injured by the obstruction of access to abortion
services;
(9) legislation is necessary to prohibit the obstruction of access by
women to abortion services and to ensure that persons injured by such
conduct, as well as the Attorney General, can seek redress in the Federal
courts;
(10) the obstruction of access to abortion services can be prohibited, and the right of injured parties to seek redress in the courts can be
established, without abridging the exercise of any rights guaranteed
under the First Amendment to the Constitution or other law; and
(11) Congress has the affirmative power under section 8 of article
1 of the Constitution and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to enact such legislation.
Id.
The proposed bill amends Title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. 300aaa et seq.) by adding the following new section:
SEC. 2715. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES.
(a) Prohibited Activities.-Whoever(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person
is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other
person or any class of persons, from(A) obtaining abortion services; or
(B) lawfully aiding another person to obtain abortion services; or
(2) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a medical
facility or in which a medical facility is located, or attempts to do
so, because such facility provides abortion services, shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedy provided in subsection (e).
S.636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
President Clinton signed the bill into law on May 26, 1994. Gwen Ifill, Clinton
Signs Bill Banning Blockades and Violent Acts at Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994,
at A18. President Clinton proclaimed: "'No person seeking medical care, no physician providing that care should have to endure harassments or threats or obstruction
or intimidation or even murder from vigilantes who take the law into their own hands
because they think they know what the law ought to be."' Id. An anti-abortion group
immediately filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the law. Id.
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remedy is necessary to curb the use of violence in the battle over
abortion.

J Paige Lambdin

